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THE ETHICS OF REPRESENTING FOUNDERS 
PAUL R. TREMBLAY? 
ABSTRACT 
Lawyers assisting entrepreneurial startups frequently work with 
individual founders before any formal organizational client mate-
rializes. In advising founders about such legal matters as whether 
to establish an entity, and if so, which entity best fits the needs of 
the enterprise, as well as how to arrange the owners’ relationships 
within the business, the lawyer necessarily has an attorney-client 
relationship with someone. The prevailing scholarship about startup 
representation pays surprisingly little attention to the posture of 
the lawyer and her founder-clients in the pre-organization context. 
This Article investigates the lawyer’s responsibilities and commit-
ments in depth. 
A lawyer working with a solo founder faces few inherent ethical 
challenges in that role. By contrast, a lawyer assisting multiple 
founders—likely the most common startup arrangement—encoun-
ters critical ethical choices. She may represent each of the founders 
individually and jointly, or she may represent the collectivity as a 
de facto partnership. That mutually exclusive distinction driven, the 
Article argues, by the nature of the startup’s business activity, affects 
the lawyer’s responsibilities and the founders’ duties to one another. 
The founders’ counsel also must account for the fact that the startup 
world in practice can be quite fluid, with a team of founders shift-
ing over time, as some participants drift away and are replaced by 
new team members. The departing founders will then qualify ei-
ther as former clients or as former partners, and in either instance 
the lawyer must be transparent about her duties to the remaining 
founders. Finally, in those settings where the founders intend to 
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establish a charitable organization—one that will not have owners— 
the lawyer’s duties to the founders are further complicated. 
This Article examines the ethical responsibilities of the founders’ 
lawyer in each of those contexts in light of the best reading of avail-
able substantive law teachings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most new businesses are founded by individuals.1 Those indi-
viduals, if the business continues beyond the conception stage, 
most often will establish some entity, such as a corporation or an 
LLC, through which to operate the enterprise.2 And, quite frequently 
the entity choice and creation take place with the assistance of 
counsel.3 When a lawyer assists the individuals to establish an en-
tity and to address other startup-related legal matters, the lawyer 
represents someone—perhaps the individuals, perhaps an incho-
ate group, or perhaps an actual partnership. This Article explores 
and articulates the nature of the lawyer’s relationship with the 
founders of such businesses prior to the emergence of a separate, 
cognizable organization. 
If the founder of the new business is a solo individual (or an or-
ganization), the representational strategies are straightforward and 
need no guidance here.4 If the founders are multiple individuals, 
the representational strategies are hardly straightforward, and this 
Article will attempt to clarify their components. This topic has re-
ceived insufficient attention in the legal ethics and entrepreneurship 
literature up to now, notwithstanding the substantial attention 
paid to the role of the lawyer representing organizations,5 including 
                                                                                                            
1 WHO STARTED NEW BUSINESSES IN 2013?, KAUFFMAN FOUND. & LEGALZOOM, 
at 1–5 (Jan. 2014), http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/Kauffman_org/research 
%20reports%20and%20covers/2014/01/who_started_new_business_in_2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D8YT-QGWT] (treating founders as individuals by polling about 
age, gender, and levels of education). In 2015, 679,072 businesses in the United 
States were less than one year old. Entrepreneurship and the U.S. Economy, 
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.bls.gov/bdm/entrepreneurship 
/bdm_chart1.htm [https://perma.cc/SJ5E-YFFM]. 
2 See Ann MacDonald, Is It Time to Convert Your Sole Proprietorship to a 
Corporation or LLC?, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/is-it 
-time-to-convert-your-sole-proprietorship-to-a-corporation-or-llc [https://perma 
.cc/ZTZ3-UDTS] (stating that business owners incorporate only after knowing 
the business is viable). 
3 See Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to 
Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 773–75 (2004) (stating 
that counsel assists entrepreneurs to clear legal hurdles such as entity choice). 
4 For a discussion of the types of issues that counsel for an entrepreneur ought 
to address, see generally Abraham J.B. Cable, Startup Lawyers at the Outskirts, 
50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 163 (2014); Mann et al., supra note 3. 
5 See, e.g., John M. Burman, Ethical Considerations When Representing Organ-
izations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 581 (2003) [hereinafter Burman, Ethical Considerations]; 
James M. Fischer, Representing Partnerships: Who Is/Are the Client(s)?, 26 PAC. 
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small organizations and startups.6 The lawyer’s role in working 
with multiple founders is complicated by three considerations, each 
of which serves as a central theme of this Article. First, even if the 
advice to the lawyer is that prudence and best practices would urge 
her to develop a transparent and comprehensive engagement agree-
ment identifying the client(s) and reviewing all of the critical com-
plications that the representation is likely to entail, that advice 
must be preceded by a well-grounded understanding of the de-
fault principles around which the engagement agreement will be 
crafted. Second, and as a significant example of the first theme, some 
instances of multiple founder representation will involve a collec-
tion of individuals, while other instances will involve a partnership 
by operation of law, whether the founders know it or desire it.7 The 
lawyer’s responsibilities will differ depending on which context 
applies, and therefore the lawyer must be able to reliably recognize 
when partnership principles apply and when they do not. 
Finally, virtually none of the commentary addresses the lawyer’s 
duties amid the reality of what I will call “founder drift.”8 In many 
                                                                                                            
L.J. 961 (1995); Burnet Maybank III & Cathy Black, Ethical Considerations 
for Transactional Lawyers, S.C. LAW., July/Aug. 1994, at 37; Lawrence E. 
Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward a Real-
istic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466 (1989); D. Ryan Nayar, Almost Clients: A 
Closer Look at Attorney Responsibility in the Context of Entity Representation, 
41 TEX. J. BUS. L. 313 (2006); Thomas E. Rutledge, When Your Client Is an 
Organization—Some of the Problems Not Resolved by Rule 1.13, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 
357 (2013); William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer 
Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57 (2003); Note, 
An Expectations Approach to Client Identity, 106 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1993). 
6 See generally Edna Selan Epstein, Who Is the Client in the Closely Held 
Corporation?, 40 LITIG. 8 (2013); Darian M. Ibrahim, Solving the Everyday Prob-
lem of Client Identity in the Context of Closely Held Businesses, 56 ALA. L. REV. 
181 (2004); Robert R. Keatinge, The Implications of Fiduciary Relationships in 
Representing Limited Liability Companies and Other Unincorporated Associa-
tions and Their Partners or Members, 25 STETSON L. REV. 389 (1995); Bryan J. 
Pechersky, Note, Representing General Partnerships and Close Corporations: 
A Situational Analysis of Professional Responsibility, 73 TEX. L. REV. 919 (1995); 
John M. Burman, Forming the Lawyer-Client Relationship, Part III Special Consid-
erations When Representing a New Organization, WYO. LAW., Dec. 2012, at 46 
[hereinafter Burman, Forming the Lawyer-Client Relationship]. 
7 See Richard A. Booth, Partnership Law and the Single Entity Defense, 18 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 4 (2012) (“There is no need for a written agreement. 
Partnership happens.”). See infra notes 169–80 and accompanying text. 
8 See John C. Ale & Buck McKinney, Stumbling into Partnerships: How Bands, 
Business Owners and Strategic Allies Find Themselves in Inadvertent Partnerships, 
43 TEX. J. BUS. L. 465 (2009); Robert W. Hillman & Donald J. Weidner, Partners 
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settings, and especially so in high-tech enterprises with little capital 
investment required, the collectivity of founders will manifest as 
a shifting array, with some “helpers” present when the lawyer first 
encounters the business—only to drift away later, and often be re-
placed by new helpers. Closely connected to the drift phenomenon is 
the lawyer’s responsibility to discern who among the array of help-
ers qualifies as a “founder,” assuming, as is likely, that capacity mat-
ters to the legal engagement questions and the resulting duties of 
the lawyer. 
The questions just described apply to the lawyer’s work with 
for-profit enterprises owned by some founders, but they apply as 
well, if in a quite different fashion, to nonprofit social enterprises 
whose founders have no ownership rights. This Article will ex-
plore both of those contexts. The lawyer’s responsibilities may 
also differ, or at least her strategic considerations will vary, de-
pending on whether the lawyer charges fees for the legal work 
provided, or whether she represents the founders on a pro bono 
basis. The discussion here will address that factor as well. 
Part I briefly examines why these issues matter, given that most 
practitioners will define the relationship with founder-clients 
through an engagement letter or retainer agreement articulating 
the client’s identity and the lawyer’s expectations.9 As we shall see, 
understanding the substantive duties that exist outside of such 
an agreement is critical not just for those (presumably few) law-
yers who will engage in representation without a clear writing, but 
for all such lawyers, as the permissible permutations of the rep-
resentational contours will depend on the lawyer’s appreciation 
of the available choices.10 The Article then begins its substantive 
discussion with for-profit enterprises in the private practice con-
text, with the lawyer expecting to be paid for the representation. 
In the for-profit world, much turns on whether the collectivity 
qualifies as a partnership.11 Part II begins with “inchoate” enter-
prises, which this Article argues do not constitute partnerships. If the 
lawyer represents a collection of founders who are not partners, 
                                                                                                            
Without Partners: The Legal Status of Single Person Partnerships, 17 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 449 (2012). 
9 See Burman, Forming the Lawyer-Client Relationship, supra note 6, at 47; 
see also Fischer, supra note 5, at 962. 
10 See Burman, Forming the Lawyer-Client Relationship, supra note 6, at 47. 
11 See Fischer, supra note 5, at 961. 
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she necessarily represents the individuals,12 and Part II addresses 
her duties in that joint representation context, along with her choice 
to represent just one of the founders. Part II includes how those ordi-
nary joint representation dynamics are affected by the founder 
drift phenomenon, as well as the challenge of identifying which of 
the initial (or later) collective ought to serve as the lawyer’s joint 
clients. Part III then addresses “active” for-profit businesses, which 
most will agree are in fact partnerships by operation of law.13 In 
this setting, the lawyer most likely represents the partnership as 
an entity and not the individual founders,14 although Part III exam-
ines whether that is a legal truism or whether the parties have a 
choice to proceed in a different fashion. Once again, this discus-
sion must account for the coming and going of founders who might 
qualify as partners. 
Part IV turns to the context of nonprofit or charitable organi-
zations. Perhaps unfortunately for the lawyer’s understanding of 
her duties as well as for the analytical simplicity of this Part, the 
distinction at the founder stage between “for-profit” and “nonprofit” 
enterprises will sometimes not be clear, as the founders may have 
a choice about how to structure a particular business.15 But for those 
enterprises that will eventually be established as charitable and/or 
tax-exempt organizations, which cannot include an ownership ele-
ment, the lawyer’s responsibilities to the founders are, as Part IV 
shows, even less clear than within the for-profit world. Founders 
of charitable or community organizations have lessened rights to de-
termine the mission and strategic visions of the organization. The 
client base in those settings is likely to be more fluid and more am-
biguous than in an enterprise owned by some identifiable persons.16 
Finally, lawyers offering guidance to nonprofit entities will operate 
amid what might be termed a “thicker theory of the good,”17 a qual-
ity absent from the private enterprise universe and therefore alter-
ing some of the lawyer’s representational responsibilities. 
                                                                                                            
12 See Burman, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, at 589. 
13 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCS 101 (2004); 
Booth, supra note 7, at 4. 
14 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 115–16. 
15 See Paul R. Tremblay, Counseling Community Groups, 17 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 389, 390 (2010). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 389 (stating that nonprofit lawyers represent “the dispossessed, the 
exploited, and the powerless”). 
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I. DEFAULT UNDERSTANDINGS OF FOUNDER REPRESENTATION 
A “best practices” standard of prudent transactional lawyering 
will recommend that a lawyer representing startup founders estab-
lish the contours of his representation through a written retainer 
agreement or engagement letter.18 In some jurisdictions, a writ-
ten agreement is required, at least when the lawyer charges a 
fee.19 In light of that reality, it is fair to inquire why lawyers need 
to understand the default nature of the attorney-client relation-
ship where no such agreement is in place. Of course, sometimes, 
whether consistent with the applicable ethics rules or not, law-
yers will proceed to work with founders without such a clear ar-
ticulation, and those lawyers will benefit (if perhaps in hindsight, 
after something went amiss) in understanding what the default 
arrangements seem to be.20 But a moment’s reflection illustrates 
why all lawyers working with startup founders need to appreciate 
the permissible possibilities of the agreement. 
A lawyer offering to represent a group of founders must, at the 
time the retainer has been negotiated or determined (but not before 
then), elect whether to identify the “client” (either the individuals 
or an entity) as either a partnership or, perhaps, a prospective 
formal organization such as a corporation.21 The lawyer might also 
choose to offer joint representation to both the individuals and the 
entity.22 The lawyer’s judgment and his negotiation with the indi-
vidual founders will guide that decision. However, in order to craft 
such an engagement agreement, the lawyer must understand the 
available choices, and it is not clear that every choice will be avail-
able in every setting. The default substantive doctrine will limit 
some choices or perhaps require some. 
                                                                                                            
18 Unsurprisingly, many observers note the importance of a written client 
agreement. See, e.g., STEPHEN F. REED & ESTHER S. BARRON, ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 89 (2013); see also Fischer, supra note 5, at 962. 
19 The Model Rules recommend, but do not require, a written fee agreement. 
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(b) (2013). Some states, however, 
require that fee agreements be in writing, subject to some minor exceptions. 
See, e.g., MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(b)(1) (2016). 
20 See Fischer, supra note 5, at 963 (noting that the default rules are useful 
for those without agreements). 
21 See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text (discussing authorities al-
lowing for retroactive entity client representation). 
22 See Fischer, supra note 5, at 963 (noting that under an “aggregate theory” 
a lawyer represents both individuals and entity). 
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For instance, as the proceeding discussion will show, a critical 
pivot point for the lawyer to navigate is whether the several founders 
are already a partnership or not.23 It is not an answer to assert 
that the lawyer should simply decide, along with his client, which 
designation they prefer. If the participants are not partners, and 
if the default substantive doctrine would not by operation of law 
deem their enterprise as a partnership, the lawyer may not have 
the authority to declare that he will treat the group as partners.24 
With partnership comes many responsibilities and possibly un-
foreseen liabilities.25 If the lawyer’s designation of the group as a 
partnership for purposes of the retainer agreement serves to es-
tablish a partnership that otherwise would not exist, that choice may 
have profound consequences. Alternatively, if the lawyer’s desig-
nation of the group as a partnership has no such effect—if, in 
other words, the absence of required partnership elements cannot 
be overcome by the lawyer’s having chosen that designation in an 
engagement letter, which seems likely26—then different compli-
cations ensue, as the lawyer’s client then has no actual existence.  
Similarly, and conversely, if the default designation were to 
deem the enterprise a partnership, but the lawyer’s engagement 
letter opts instead for individual representation of the partners 
(without, of course, a recognition that they are partners), that choice 
seemingly may always be available. However, it leaves the enter-
prise itself (the partnership) without counsel, and any conflicts 
arising from partnership duties and benefits will not have been 
sorted out at this early stage of the representation. 
One response might be to recommend that the lawyer ought to 
use his legal skill to assist the founders in choosing the best avail-
able representational designation. That is possibly wise advice, 
but, of course, the lawyer’s client or clients for purposes of that 
version of the choice-of-entity counseling will be subject to the de-
fault considerations that this project will seek to articulate. 
                                                                                                            
23 See infra notes 169–80 and accompanying text. 
24 See Burman, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, at 596. 
25 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 125–33. 
26 In order for a partnership by default to come into existence, the venture 
must include the necessary elements. The absence of the elements will not over-
come an agreement among the participants to consider their arrangement a part-
nership. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Indus. Indem. Co., 688 P.2d 1243, 1245 (Mont. 
1984) (noting “what the parties call their arrangement or intend their arrange-
ment to be is irrelevant” if the elements determine a different result). 
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One final consideration warrants a mention here. Even with a 
clear engagement agreement, the phenomenon of founder drift, if 
and when it occurs, will prompt some adjustments to the relation-
ship between the lawyer and the remaining founders, and the de-
fault understandings will matter there as well. 
For these reasons, this Article proceeds as though the lawyer 
has no express agreement resolving the issues explored here. As 
the analysis addresses differing permutations, keep in mind that 
most lawyers will have better clarity in practice because of the terms 
of the agreement chosen with any particular group of founders. 
But, the default arrangements will continue to influence the avail-
able choices and strategies. 
II. INCHOATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 
Not every group of entrepreneurs assembled to carry out a new 
business will qualify as a partnership.27 Some will, of course, but 
many will not. In what can be termed “inchoate” businesses, no 
entity exists to serve as the client until the founders have chosen and 
then established some such entity. In that setting, the lawyer’s client 
will be one or more of the founders.28 This Part examines the tog-
gle point that triggers partnership status, and then proceeds to 
identify the lawyer’s responsibilities when that toggle point has not 
been reached, including how the lawyer in that universe responds 
to founder drift. It then addresses those minority jurisdictions 
that permit the lawyer to treat the collection of founders as a sin-
gle group client notwithstanding the absence of a partnership. 
A. When Does a Partnership Arise? 
It is an elementary principle of business organizations doctrine 
that a partnership arises by default, through an “association of two 
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit ... 
whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.”29 Four 
elements must be present for a business to qualify as a partnership: 
                                                                                                            
27 Small Business Encyclopedia: Partnership, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www 
.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/partnership [https://perma.cc/2Q9T-S3ZU]. 
28 Merri A. Baldwin, Lawyers Representing Startups: Managing Ethical Obli-
gations and Risks, CAL. BAR J. (Dec. 2013), http://apps.calbar.ca.gov/mcle-self 
study/mcle_home.aspx?testID=80 [https://perma.cc/5JLA-6ZC8]. 
29 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997) 
[hereinafter RUPA]. 
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(1) two or more persons; (2) associated; (3) to carry on a business 
for profit; and (4) as co-owners.30 With those four elements in place, a 
partnership exists, “whether or not the persons intend[ed] to form a 
partnership.”31 A shared intention or plan among several founders 
to establish a business, without any actual business activity or enter-
prise to control or to own, will not constitute a partnership.32 
The available common law on when a partnership actually begins 
to exist is remarkably opaque. Courts have held that no partnership 
results when two or more persons actively plan to go into business 
together, but the terms of the resulting business deal are too vague 
to be identified or relied upon.33 At the same time, courts have also 
held that the element of “carrying on a business for profit” can cover 
plans for future business activity: “[I]t is not essential to the existence 
of a partnership that business have actually been carried on. An 
agreement to carry it on creates the partnership[.]”34 The critical 
considerations appear to be shared ownership of the business with 
accompanying management control, and sufficient clarity about the 
terms of the enterprise and the substance of the products or ser-
vices to be marketed, even if the business has not yet begun to 
operate.35 Some beginning businesses will lack those qualities.36 
Scores of reported cases have resolved disputes with a finding that 
no partnership exists in settings with no formal entity in place, but 
those cases typically involve questions of whether a participant ought 
                                                                                                            
30 CHRISTINE HURT ET AL., BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 2.01 
(2d ed. Supp. 2015). 
31 RUPA § 202(a). 
32 See, e.g., Ramone v. Lang, No. Civ. A. 1592-N, 2006 WL 905347, at *13 
(Del. Ch. 2006) (finding when “[t]he relationship between [the participants] was still 
inchoate,” no partnership existed); HURT ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.04(c). 
33 Ramone, 2006 WL 905347, at *13 (holding that agreeing to negotiate does 
not create a partnership if there are no terms or agreed-upon relationship); Dreyfuss 
v. Dreyfuss, 701 So. 2d 437, 438–39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a father 
and son did not have a partnership when terms such as payments and splitting 
profits had not been discussed); Maloney v. Pihera, 573 N.E.2d 1379, 1388 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1991) (“While the parties’ intended goal may have been to form a part-
nership, we agree with the trial court that no partnership was established.”). 
34 Curley Elec., Inc. v. Bills, 121 P.3d 106, 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (quot-
ing ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BLOOMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 59 (1968)). 
35 See Ramone, 2006 WL 905347, at *13; see also RUPA § 202(a). 
36 Some, although limited, commentary acknowledges that some founders 
ought to be treated as individuals. See, e.g., Carl A. Pierce, Representing One 
Client at a Time in Connection with the Formation and Organization of a Cor-
poration, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 327, 347, 353 (2007). 
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to be treated as an employee37 or a lender38 rather than a partner 
of the other participant. Those cases are of little to no use to the 
present inquiry, as they always involve ongoing business enterprises 
with debts or profits worth wrangling over, and, in concluding that 
no partnership exists, the courts find that the true owner is a sole 
proprietor.39 That line of cases does serve as a useful reminder that 
the lawyer working with what appears to be multiple founders does 
need to attend to the possibility that only one of those founders is 
the owner of the business, with the other participants deserving 
of a status as something other than a founder or an owner.40 
In light of the available doctrine, it appears likely that most 
startups seeking legal advice will either qualify as partnerships 
or as sole proprietorships that have employees. But, not every 
startup will fit the requirements of Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act (RUPA). Here is an example of a startup where the partici-
pants likely do not qualify as partners—a story we may use for 
the discussion of the lawyer’s duties: 
Janelle, Arjun, and Netia are all post-docs working at University 
Hospital in its mental health department. Janelle has been puz-
zling through an idea for the past year or so for a software program, 
or perhaps a mobile device app, that could assist social service 
agencies to track opioid addicts and their outpatient care as 
well as their interactions with the law enforcement community. 
Janelle believes that this invention, if it can work, will be valu-
able to medical professionals around the country. She persuaded 
Arjun and Netia to work with her to craft the mechanics, the 
coding, and the possible marketing and business plan for this 
invention. The trio also has been discussing with Sami, a for-
mer roommate of Netia who is an expert coder, the possibility 
of his assisting on a part-time basis with the technical compo-
nents of the software program. 
 
Arjun has imagined a provisional name for the device—Addic-
Trak. The group has received some technical assistance and 
                                                                                                            
37 See, e.g., Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 439, 441–42 (6th Cir. 
1996) (holding that the party was an employee, not a partner); BAINBRIDGE, 
supra note 13, at 104–05. 
38 See, e.g., TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 231 (2d Cir. 
2006) (holding that the party was a lender, not a partner); BAINBRIDGE, supra 
note 13, at 108–12. 
39 See, e.g., Fenwick v. Unemp. Compensation Comm’n, 44 A.2d 172, 174–75 
(N.J. 1945); Elizabeth R. Darby, Comment, Relations Between Attorneys: When 
Does a Partnership Exist?, 18 J. LEGAL PROF. 319, 322 (1993). 
40 See HURT ET AL., supra note 30, at § 2.01 (citing examples). 
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workspace from a local incubator, and has been promised infor-
mally a small amount of seed funding from what is known in the 
entrepreneurship world as “the three Fs.”41 Janelle and Netia 
have each spent about $300 on software peripherals useful to 
the work. The advisors at the startup incubator have urged the 
group to seek some legal assistance earlier rather than later, and 
so Janelle contacted Sofia Schendel, a partner in a three-member 
law firm catering to small business transactional work. Sofia 
meets with Janelle and Arjun (Netia could not attend the meeting 
given her work schedule at the hospital) to discuss the possible 
legal needs of this startup enterprise. 
The collection of participants in the AddicTrak enterprise most 
likely, at the time that Sofia meets with representatives of the 
group, would not qualify as a partnership. Its business ideas are 
manifestly “inchoate.” The app or computer program has not yet 
been developed—it is, for now, simply a vision. There has been 
virtually no capital investment, and there is nothing yet to own 
collectively. Sofia, the lawyer, cannot in good faith treat the founders 
as partners, at least not yet. She needs another representational 
vehicle. That vehicle is, most likely, joint founder representation. 
B. Joint Founder Representation 
1. Whom Will the Law Firm Represent? 
In the AddicTrak example, Sofia’s law firm would represent the 
founders as joint clients, most often with an explicit understanding 
that the firm would later represent any resulting business entity 
formed as part of the representation.42 The only other plausible 
alternative would be for the law firm to represent only one of the 
founders.43 Since solo representation is presumably less risky than 
multiple representation,44 that alternative cannot be dismissed out-
right, and at least one commentator has implied that this option 
                                                                                                            
41 See Martin Zwilling, 8 Best Practices to Seek Funding From Friends, Fam-
ily and Fools, ENTREPRENEUR (May 22, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com 
/article/246404 [https://perma.cc/CDJ7-3FXR]. 
42 See Burman, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, at 590, 593–98. 
43 The remaining alternative—that the lawyer would represent two of the three 
founders—seems implausible, and its implications would be effectively addressed 
by the ethical analysis on the lawyer’s work for all three founders. See infra note 44. 
44 Representing one client will on occasion trigger worries about conflicts of 
interest, but representing multiple clients simultaneously always triggers that 
worry. At least one observer sees those worries as significant enough to justify 
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ought to be favored by founders’ lawyers.45 With single represen-
tation, the unrepresented founders either remain without counsel, or 
choose, or perhaps are nudged, to retain their own lawyers.46 
The attraction of choosing to represent one founder and not the 
remaining founders arises from the fact that the lawyer for the 
represented founder (let us assume this would mean Janelle) in the 
inchoate setting does not owe duties to the other founders.47 If the 
law imposed a duty on the law firm to treat all three founders equally 
regardless of the arrangement, then this alternative would not be 
worth considering at all. Absent the application of partnership prin-
ciples and the accompanying fiduciary duties among the partners, 
no source of authority imposes on the participants, and therefore 
possibly on the lawyer,48 any fiduciary duties to one another in an 
inchoate business setting.49 
Nevertheless, representing just one of the three founders is likely 
less common in practice than forming a relationship with all of 
                                                                                                            
a ban on multiple representation. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Three’s a Crowd: A 
Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 387, 458 (2001). 
45 See Pierce, supra note 36, at 344–47. 
46 Id. at 340. 
47 The duties owed among the participants arises from partnership law. See 
infra note 49. In some limited contexts, where the participants have operated 
collectively in such a way as to invite reliance on the good faith of one another, 
courts have imposed fiduciary-like duties even in the absence of a true part-
nership. See, e.g., Zaki Kulaibee Est. v. McFliker, 771 F.3d 1301, 1310–11, 1316 
(11th Cir. 2014) (consignment relationship); see also Shain Inv. Co. v. Cohen, 
443 N.E.2d 126, 130–31 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (joint venture missing one nec-
essary element); Cusick v. Phillippi, 709 P.2d 1226, 1228, 1230 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1985) (commission merchant); HURT ET AL., supra note 30, at 2–12. 
48 This discussion assumes for the sake of argument that a lawyer representing 
a fiduciary will be forbidden to assist that client in a breach of his fiduciary duty. 
There is substantial authority asserting that it is not professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to participate in that activity, but contrary authority does exist. 
See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 361 (1991); 
Pierce, supra note 36, at 353–54. This topic receives more discussion in the next 
section, where the business is not inchoate and therefore a partnership likely 
exists as a matter of law. See infra Part III. 
49 The source of authority for some duties among the participants is part-
nership law as well as the law of joint venture, which tracks partnership law. 
See RICHARD D. HARROCH, 1 PARTNERSHIP & JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS 
§ 2.09 (1992); George W. Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic 
Alliances, 57 BUS. LAW. 55, 55, 71, 104 (2001); Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of Inter-
est and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint Venture, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 
63, 64, 122 (1987). 
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them—and for good reason. The choice to represent just one 
founder means that the other founders either remain without coun-
sel (the far more likely course) or retain their own counsel, with 
the same joint-versus-individual choice point for a different law 
firm.50 The latter is problematic in a number of ways,51 apart from 
the obvious added expense. Two or more law firms looking after 
their separate clients’ interests in a co-owned business invites frac-
tiousness. It is not the way that most advisors recommend that a 
collaborative, risk-sharing, soon-to-be jointly owned enterprise ought 
to form.52 
If the other founders do not get counsel, the potential for frac-
tiousness is minimized, but not eliminated. Putting aside the fact 
that the lawyer would need to find some system through which to 
identify which founder receives the legal services,53 once that choice 
has been made the lawyer ordinarily must put the interests of 
that founder ahead of those of the unrepresented founders.54 Typ-
ically, the represented founder (Janelle) will desire to treat Arjun 
and Netia with the utmost care and fairness. Arjun and Netia, how-
ever, will likely be uncertain either of the reliability of that senti-
ment, or whether Janelle’s counsel will nurture it.55 Put another 
                                                                                                            
50 Pierce, supra note 36, at 340. 
51 The prospect of separating collaborators in a new enterprise with little 
initial investment into three discrete represented parties to negotiate and ar-
range their respective and collective interests is not very attractive, and it is 
not likely to nurture the success of the relationship. For an insightful develop-
ment of this concern in the family law context, see Rebecca Aviel, Counsel for 
the Divorce, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1099, 1099, 1147 (2014). 
52 See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 
682–83 (2d ed. 1994); Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 197 (implying that founders 
need separate counsel from the company, but not stating that each founder 
needs his or her own lawyer); Anne M. Tucker, Teaching LLCs by Design, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 525, 551 (2014). But see Alexander Muse, Founders, Your 
Startup Lawyer Doesn’t Represent You, STARTUPMUSE (Jan. 9, 2016), http://start 
upmuse.com/23617-2/ [https://perma.cc/6BDT-RZ9F] (implying that founders 
need separate counsel from the company, but not stating that each founder 
needs his or her own lawyer). 
53 See Pierce, supra note 36, at 338–40. 
54 See, e.g., id. at 342. 
55 See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and Delegation: The 
Ethics of Marital Representation, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 101 n.13 (1998) 
(discussing a similar arrangement with spouses and stating “[w]hile this model 
may be economically efficient, it may result in a set of additional problems in 
which the unrepresented spouse does not understand the lawyer’s role”). 
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way, a promise by the lawyer to Arjun and Netia that their interests 
will be respected deeply during the representation of Janelle is 
not as powerful or effective as the lawyer’s explicit commitment 
to represent the interests of all founders as joint clients.56 
Because of its seeming prevalence among founders and their 
lawyers, and because it most robustly nurtures the community of 
interests within the emerging business,57 the proceeding discus-
sion will accept the premise that the law firm will represent each 
of the founders jointly and individually. The joint representation 
of the three founders is presumptively proper, subject to the con-
ditions explored below.58 
2. Who Qualifies as a “Founder”? 
To proceed with joint representation, the law firm needs to 
identify who among the group of individuals working within the 
inchoate business ought to be treated as a “founder,” and there-
after likely one of the joint clients.59 Especially for high-tech busi-
nesses that do not need significant infusions of capital in order to 
generate the business model and a prototype of the platform or 
application, the collectivity of founders may have a rather fluid 
quality.60 A few buddies may work on the project for a while, but 
                                                                                                            
56 Professor Pierce notes that Arjun and Netia would qualify as prospective 
clients of the law firm, triggering some confidentiality and limited loyalty duties 
on the part of the law firm to them. Pierce, supra note 36, at 338–40 (referencing 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.18). That fact offers little comfort to the 
unrepresented founders, as the law firm is unlikely to counsel the unrepre-
sented individuals about those commitments. 
57 See Aviel, supra note 51, at 1143 (explicating the importance of the shared 
commitments when compared to individual interests); Patricia M. Batt, The 
Family Unit as Client: A Means to Address the Ethical Dilemmas Confronting 
Elder Law Attorneys, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 319, 337–41 (1992) (comparing 
family members to organizational constituents whose shared interests super-
sede individual interests); Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to 
“Non-Clients”: Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity 
Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 
659, 687–95 (1994). 
58 See generally Tremblay, supra note 15. 
59 See Burman, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, at 588–98 (discussing 
the difficulties in identifying clients during the formation of new organizations). 
60 See, e.g., Tremblay, supra note 15 (discussing the counseling of loosely 
structured fluid groups); Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death—
The Role of Competition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL 
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if income generation is not quickly forthcoming they may return 
to day jobs or other attractive endeavors with other technology 
entrepreneurs. The fluidity issue is especially pronounced in pro 
bono, inchoate contexts, since the availability of free legal services 
means that anyone on the team could agree to be a founder/client 
without any major commitment.61 
The law firm, and especially a firm providing services on a pro 
bono basis, needs to be intentional and prudent in identifying 
which of the entrepreneurial “buddies” will become formal clients 
of the firm. That decision belongs to the firm, which always has 
the discretion about which clients it will choose to represent and 
to whom it will offer its services.62 Those who receive an offer to 
become clients of the firm most often will be the individuals who 
the team expects will become equity holders or members of the 
resulting organization—in other words, those who would by de-
fault be partners once the business has begun to operate.63 Em-
ployees, even those compensated with stock for their services, are 
not partners, according to partnership doctrine.64 Representing 
                                                                                                            
BUS. L. J. 265 (2006) (discussing equity compensation and the tendency of Sil-
icon Valley employees to job hop). 
61 See Pierce, supra note 36, at 343–44 (discussing the attorney-client rela-
tionship in the pro bono context). 
62 It is fundamental that, except in inadvertent representation contexts or 
court-appointments, a law firm may choose its clients. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, 
JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 6.03 n.4 (4th ed. 2014) 
(“Although lawyers are entirely free to accept such a representation [of a client 
who has engaged in criminal or illicit conduct], no individual lawyer is legally 
required to accept any particular matter, except upon court appointment.”); 
RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000) (discussing 
consent as an essential component of an attorney-client relationship). A lawyer 
may not discriminate in her choice of clients. See Nathanson v. Mass. Comm’n 
Against Discrimination, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. 2003) (discussing allegedly discriminatory practices by a female attorney who 
refused to represent men in her legal practice). And, many argue that lawyers 
have a moral (if not legal) obligation to represent those who cannot locate rep-
resentation elsewhere. See, e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, The Common Good and 
the Duty to Represent: Must the Last Lawyer in Town Take Any Case?, 40 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 137, 138, 154 (1999). 
63 Recall that a partnership requires ownership and operations. See CRANE 
AND BLOOMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP, supra note 34, at 59; see supra note 35 and 
accompanying text. 
64 Employees of an unincorporated business do not qualify as partners un-
less they also possess an ownership interest in the enterprise along with indi-
cia of control. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 107; David B. Wilkins, Partner, 
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only future partners and not future employees minimizes the po-
tential conflicts of interest for the firm. Those assertions—that the 
firm should offer its legal services to the future owners and not to the 
future employees, and that the firm makes that determination—
are rather easy to state, but mask at least two complications that 
the firm must confront in practice. 
First, with technology startups especially, the participant found-
ers may not be able easily or confidently to determine who qualifies 
as a future owner and who ought to be seen as a future employee. 
Indeed, since employees in technology startups are often compen-
sated by stock options or their equivalent,65 the ownership crite-
rion may not be sufficiently salient to serve the purpose the law firm 
needs. Because in representing those individuals the firm must 
minimize potential conflicts of interest, the choice of identified cli-
ents becomes a critical strategic judgment. The second complica-
tion follows from the first. The earlier analysis suggested that a firm 
is typically better off representing founders as joint clients rather 
than choosing one founder to serve as the client, with the expec-
tation that the law firm would provide meaningful business-wide 
legal assistance while having legal duties solely to that one 
founder.66 The recognition that “founder” is a more slippery con-
cept than one might desire reintroduces at least part of that worry. 
A firm committing to represent the founders as joint clients often 
will still have to identify some members of the startup team as 
“non-founders”—that is to say employees, or perhaps consultants, 
                                                                                                            
Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1264, 1264, 
1268, 1271 (2007); Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Ohio 1994) 
(upholding trial court’s findings that the plaintiff was an employee, not a partner). 
65 It is common that employees of cash-poor startup businesses work not for 
wages, but for stock options and similar promises of equity in the business. 
See, e.g., Booth, supra note 60, at 272 (“[I]t is perfectly easy to devise an option 
plan or other system of equity compensation in a startup firm. Indeed, it is 
quite common in small firms for an employee to work (in part) for an ownership 
share.”); Meghan Casserly, Understanding Employee Equity: Every Startup’s 
Secret Weapon, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/meghancasserly/2013/03/08/understanding-employee-equity-bill-harris-sxsw 
/#62d657ff3e05 [https://perma.cc/P9QV-3WFK]. Whether that arrangement 
satisfies the applicable minimum wage laws is a question beyond the scope of 
this Article. For a discussion of that tension, see Adam Lang, A Hidden Danger 
for Businesses in Nevada, 14 NEV. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2009). 
66 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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and therefore not entitled to free representation.67 That process 
itself will, at times, occur with some of the non-clients present, as 
the lawyer investigates which participants best fit the “founder” 
requirements. And, since investment may be small in many tech-
nology startups, that factor may not serve as the most reliable 
proxy for ownership, as it would in other settings.68 
In the end, the law firm will exercise its discretion about to 
whom to offer joint representation in light of these considerations, 
with special attention to the possible conflicts of interest should 
the firm end up with a mix of founders and employees. In the ex-
ample above, Sofia will likely offer joint representation to Janelle, 
Arjun, and Netia; she is unlikely to offer representation to Sami, 
who does not yet appear to qualify as a founder. Nothing prohibits 
the firm from including Sami if the team requested that Sami also 
be included, as long as the joint representation conflicts questions 
are addressed expressly and adequately.69 
3. Formation of the Joint Client Relationship: 
Informed Consent 
Every joint representation presents the potential for a conflict 
of interest and invites a discussion of the special confidentiality 
rules that apply in joint representation. 
a. Consent to the Shared Representation 
Model Rule 1.7 requires informed consent, “confirmed in writing,” 
if a waivable70 conflict of interest arises.71 A conflict of interest 
                                                                                                            
67 See Wilkins, supra note 64, at 1264, 1268, 1271. 
68 The inherent lack of clarity about which of the participants in a technol-
ogy startup business qualify as “founders” has created complications for some 
law firms in the past. See, e.g., Robbins v. Payne, 55 S.W.3d 740, 746 (Tex. App. 
2001) (determining whether partnership existed and what fiduciary duties were 
between two founders in starting an internet services corporation). 
69 See generally Pierce, supra note 36; Wilkins, supra note 64. 
70 This Article will refer to a client’s consent to a conflict of interest as a 
“waiver,” even though that term may not represent accurately the process of 
the lawyer’s proceeding notwithstanding the conflict, especially since waivers 
in other contexts (but not here) may be implied. The “waiver” term is well-
established. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 
YALE L.J. 407, 409 (1998). 
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4) (2015). 
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exists if “there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s representa-
tion of one or more of the clients would be materially and adversely 
affected by the lawyer’s duties to one or more of the other clients.”72 
The Rule does not require such informed consent and written con-
firmation in instances of purely potential conflicts,73 but the Rule’s 
Comments suggest that in common representation of founders, a 
lawyer ought to obtain explicit consent from each client.74 
Not every joint client engagement setting creates the “signifi-
cant risk” identified in Rule 1.7(a)(2) or requires informed consent. 
For example, if a husband and wife in a seemingly stable marriage 
retain a lawyer to purchase a home together, that common repre-
sentation typically would not trigger a “significant risk” that the 
lawyer’s advocacy on behalf of either spouse would be impaired in 
any way, so informed consent ordinarily would not be required.75 
Joint representation of founders, however, presents a different set 
of circumstances, and would inevitably generate the “significant 
risk” that a lawyer must address.76 Questions of ownership inter-
ests, decision making, control, vision, and exit all invite differences 
                                                                                                            
72 The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers uses founders as its ex-
ample of this possibility. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 130 (2000). 
73 Rule 1.7, Comment 8 notes that the “mere possibility of subsequent harm” 
does not require informed consent and written confirmation. MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.7 cmt. 8. Some observers have recommended that counsel 
keep clients informed, and obtain consent, when such possibilities exist. See, e.g., 
Brad Andrews, Informed Consent to Multiple Representation Under Rule 1.7, 
ADVOCATE, Feb. 2008, at 8. Other commentators have expressed deeper reser-
vation about the shared representation model itself. See Bassett, supra note 
44, at 390; Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 186–87. 
74 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (“[A] lawyer asked to rep-
resent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially 
limited in the lawyer’s ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions 
that each might take because of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the others. The 
conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to 
the client.”). 
75 Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 55, at 100–01 (“In ... contexts, such as a mar-
ried couple’s purchase of a home, joint representation seems perfectly normal. 
Indeed, one would hardly think of suggesting a different form of representation 
where the spouses’ interests are so closely aligned.”). 
76 The Restatement implies the opposite. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 130 (2000) (stating that joint representation of 
multiple founders ordinarily does not require informed consent). 
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of opinion and of preference among the founders. One lawyer 
might not be able to accommodate all founders’ different interests 
adequately in creating the structure of a business.77 At the same 
time, one lawyer may—and individual lawyers or law firms regu-
larly do78—assist three founders in a sufficiently meaningful way, 
notwithstanding those inherent differences in interests to justify 
the use of one counsel.79 Because the risks are significant but are 
not disabling, the conflict may be waived, and the conflict must 
be waived if the law firm will engage the three founders.80 
In seeking informed consent, the lawyer must explain that the 
interests of the three clients may diverge in the future and the 
importance of accounting for that possibility at the formation stage.81 
At a minimum, a lawyer representing the founders must ensure 
that the clients know of that potential eventuality, even if the 
founders choose not to engage with it in any deep way right now.82 
Because separate lawyers would more easily advocate to protect 
the longer-term interests of each founder to the exclusion of the 
others, and because the joint lawyer must not do so for any one of 
the founders, this representation warrants a Rule 1.7 discussion 
and requires a written waiver.83 
With three or more founders, one potentially significant down-
stream worry for each member of the group is that of the minority 
squeeze out after an entity has been formed.84 Until a new entity 
becomes public or otherwise has some recognizable market value, 
each shareholder or member has very limited exit rights.85 Since 
                                                                                                            
77 See Mitchell, supra note 5, at 472–74. 
78 See id. at 474; Rutledge, supra note 5, at 362–63. 
79 See Mitchell, supra note 5, at 474. 
80 For a discussion of the counseling process involved in obtaining informed 
consent, see Tremblay, supra note 15, at 408. 
81 See Rutledge, supra note 5, at 363. 
82 Id. at 363–64. 
83 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (2015); Rutledge, supra note 
5, at 363–64. 
84 Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1167–68 (2010) (discussing “freeze-out” and “squeeze-
out” of minority shareholders); see also Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables 
(or at Least Understand Why You Should): Can Better Warning and Education 
of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce Oppression in Closely Held Businesses?, 
14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 493 (2009) (describing the squeeze-out pos-
sibilities); Simon, supra note 5, at 61–65. 
85 Means, supra note 84, at 1208; see also Molitor, supra note 84, at 512–13, 549. 
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profiting by a sale of their interest is not likely in the short term, 
founders often expect to gain some return from the enterprise by 
working in the business for a salary or obtaining dividends from 
the operating profits.86 If two of the three founders choose to con-
spire against the third, they can terminate his employment and 
cease issuing dividends without the third owner having any abil-
ity to prevent that action.87 The minority owner, being unable to 
sell his interests except to the squeezing majority owners, stands 
to lose much of his investment whether in capital or in labor spent 
developing the business. While that kind of maneuvering would 
only occur after the entity exists, any anticipation of it will occur 
while the founders remain joint clients. Since no one knows at 
formation which of the founders might conspire against the others, 
all three clients face precisely the same risk.88 It is in the interests 
of all three joint clients to address the worries by accounting for 
these possibilities in any partnership agreement or the later cor-
porate or LLC documents.89 
b. Consent to Sharing Information 
If there is any uncertainty surrounding the scope of the informed 
consent on the conflicts question, there is no uncertainty about the 
lawyer’s obligation to obtain informed consent from the founders 
as to the operation of the confidentiality duties.90 Under ordinary 
circumstances, a lawyer will explain to her individual client the pro-
tections afforded to him by the operation of Rule 1.6, which protects 
“information related to the representation” unless some exception 
applies.91 With individual representation, the world is simple: the 
                                                                                                            
86 Molitor, supra note 84, at 516–17. 
87 Id. at 515. 
88 Id. at 492. One can imagine a particularly vulnerable third client, say a 
stranger joining two business partners who already work closely together. In that 
setting, the lawyer needs to be more careful with joint representation duties. 
89 See id. at 592 (describing provisions to address these concerns). 
90 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a), (b)(7), (c) (2015). 
91 Id. r. 1.6(b). While Rule 1.6(b) offers seven discrete bases on which a lawyer 
may justify disclosure of otherwise confidential client information, those exceptions 
are rarely employed. See Ria A. Tabacco, Note, Defensible Ethics: A Proposal to 
Revise the ABA Model Rules for Criminal Defense Lawyer-Authors, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 568, 577–78 (2008); Eli Wald, Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics: Re-
solving the Tension Between Confidentiality Requirements and Contemporary 
Lawyers’ Career Paths, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 199, 203–04 (2007); John K. Villa, 
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lawyer keeps everything confidential, generally speaking.92 In com-
mon representation, that assurance must be adjusted in a critical 
way, and that adjustment requires a conversation and confirma-
tion. Rule 1.7 in its comments explains that counsel must “advise 
each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will 
have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to 
the representation should be kept from the other.”93 
The lawyer therefore will explain the absence of confidentiality 
among the three founders and, in those unusual circumstances, ne-
gotiate any special arrangement chosen by the founders to with-
hold some information belonging to one founder from the others.94 
4. Decision Making Within the Attorney-Client Relationship 
Having established a joint relationship with three individual 
clients, the law firm may proceed to develop counseling strategies 
through which the founders will choose the form of entity to es-
tablish and the content of that entity’s organizational documents 
and filings.95 By virtue of the firm having three separate retainer 
agreements with three separate (if joint) clients, the lawyer must 
honor the preferences of all three founders.96 The arrangement 
must be clear to the three clients that their decision making must 
be collective and by consensus—or, if the founders so agree, by the 
group’s own chosen matrix.97 That component of the representation 
                                                                                                            
What Can You Ethically Do When You Don’t Know What Ethically to Do?, 27 
ACC DOCKET 106, 107 (2009) (on file with author). 
92 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a). 
93 Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 31. 
94 As Comment 31 to Rule 1.7 describes, in unusual circumstances, the 
jointly represented clients will, and may, agree with the lawyer that certain 
identified information—the Comment uses trade secrets as an example—will 
not be available to the team once the lawyer has learned it from one team member. 
In most instances, that condition will make joint representation unworkable, 
but the lawyer has discretion if the facts warrant it to continue with the represen-
tation despite that compromised position. For a discussion of that complication 
in the setting of aggregate settlements, see Carol A. Needham, Advance Con-
sent to Aggregate Settlements: Reflections on Attorneys’ Fiduciary Obligations 
and Professional Responsibility Duties, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 511, 524 (2012). 
95 That “entity” could, of course, include a partnership, should the founders 
opt not to establish a more formal, publicly filed organization. Tremblay, supra 
note 15, at 438. 
96 Id. at 407–08. 
97 Id. at 408. 
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must be explicit.98 So, for example, if two of the three founders 
prefer establishing an LLC, and the third strongly prefers crea-
tion of a C corporation, the lawyer will be at an impasse, unless 
the client group has itself chosen a decision-making method (e.g., 
majority rule) to which it will adhere.99 
Two implications follow from this fundamental reality of any 
joint representation arrangement. First, the lawyer’s commitment 
to neutrality becomes both more critical and more difficult to sustain. 
In representing single clients, whether individuals or organiza-
tions, lawyers will typically proceed in a client-centered fashion.100 
That means, as many have described,101 that the lawyer’s prefer-
ences are effectively irrelevant except to the extent that those 
preferences emerge from legal obligations about which the clients 
have no choice.102 Since lawyers always will have preferences, which 
are not always based upon the legal principles involved but in-
stead arise from their own values and business judgments, the 
client-centered model discourages the lawyer from influencing 
the client’s decision-making.103 When founders disagree among 
themselves, the common lawyer must actively assist the group to 
understand all of the competing considerations, and the lawyer 
must be especially sensitive not to support one founder’s views 
over another’s.104 
                                                                                                            
98 Id. at 413. 
99 A law firm jointly representing two founders will face greater difficulties 
if the founders do not agree on a chosen course. 
100 Tremblay, supra note 15, at 397–98. 
101 See ALICIA ALVAREZ & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, INTRODUCTION TO TRANS-
ACTIONAL LAWYERING PRACTICE 1–10 (2013); DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS 
AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 2–9 (3d ed. 2011); STEPHEN 
ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND 
COUNSELING 72–105 (2009) (describing an “engaged” and collaborative ap-
proach to client decision making). 
102 See David Binder, Paul Bergman & Susan Price, Lawyers as Counselors: 
A Client-Centered Approach, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 29, 67–69 (1990). But see 
Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refine-
ment, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 593 (1990). 
103 ALVAREZ & TREMBLAY, supra note 101, at 113–14. 
104 See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 76–
86 (1978) (discussing the challenges when representing multiple clients); 
Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of 
Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Contro-
versy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211, 216–18 (1982); John A. Walton, Conflicts for Sports 
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The second implication arises from the malleability of the group’s 
chosen decision-making methods. As long as the group remains 
an “aggregate” of three clients, and not an entity,105 any agree-
ment among the three about how they will make decisions down 
the road will have a tentative, at best, functionality. Here is the 
worry: imagine that the three founders agree at the very begin-
ning of the representation, at the lawyer’s request and with a dose 
of a Rawlsian veil of ignorance,106 that a founder will acquiesce in 
a decision if two of the three members of the group favor it. And, 
imagine further that the retainer agreement or a separate writing 
confirms that commitment.107 If an outvoted founder feels strongly 
about an issue that he had not previously encountered, and refuses 
to acknowledge the ongoing validity of his previous agreement, 
where does that leave the lawyer? 
There are but two answers to that question. The most likely 
result is that the attorney will mediate among her three clients to 
arrive at some consensus to allow the business planning to pro-
ceed.108 Comment 32 to Model Rule 1.7 refers to the lawyer’s ef-
forts to “adjust a relationship between [joint] clients”109 without 
                                                                                                            
and Entertainment Attorneys: The Good News, the Bad News, and the Ugly Con-
sequences, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 259, 280–81 (1998) (addressing the issue 
in context). 
105 If the three founders were an organization, the client would most likely 
be the entity, and the lawyer would follow its decision-making systems and 
protocols. See In re Wise, 740 N.E.2d 946, 950–51, 955 (Mass. 2000) (lawyer disci-
plined for taking action ostensibly on behalf of a nonprofit organization, but 
without the consent of the duly authorized constituents). 
106 Professor Vermeule describes “[a] veil of ignorance rule … [as] a rule that 
suppresses self-interested behavior on the part of decisionmakers; it does so by 
subjecting the decisionmakers to uncertainty about the distribution of benefits 
and burdens that will result from a decision.” Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Igno-
rance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 399 (2001) (citing JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–23 (rev. ed. 1999)). 
107 See Rutledge, supra note 5, at 363. 
108 An earlier iteration of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct included 
a rule that anticipated a lawyer’s mediating among clients with common, but 
not identical, interests. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.2 (1983) 
(eliminated in the 2002 revision of the Model Rules); see also Walton, supra 
note 104, at 268–73 (discussing intermediation among joint clients). 
109 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 32 (2015); see also John S. 
Dzienkowski, Lawyers As Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Cli-
ents in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 763 (1992); Carl 
A. Pierce, ABA Model Rule 2.2: Once Applauded and Widely Adopted, Then 
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being a partisan for any one of them. With transparency, open dia-
logue, and clear written explanation detailing the role of the attorney, 
mediation among clients in this manner is ethically appropriate 
and likely quite common.110 
If the mediation does not succeed, and the founders do not 
reach consensus, then the lawyer may not represent the three 
common clients any longer (assuming that the issue on which the 
clients disagree may not be postponed or deferred).111 This is the 
fundamental risk of common representation: that the clients will 
develop a conflict that cannot be resolved, and the lawyer will 
have to withdraw from the multiple representation.112 The critical 
question upon the dissolution of the common representation is 
whether the lawyer may continue to represent the remaining two 
founders without the informed consent of the unhappy founder,113 
for there is no doubt that the law firm may continue to represent 
the remaining founders with the informed consent of the depart-
ing founder.114 That question introduces generally the question of 
founder mobility and “drift,” to which we now turn. 
                                                                                                            
Criticized, Ignored or Evaded, Now Sentenced to Death With Few Mourners, But 
Not in Tennessee, 2 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 9, 17 (2000). 
110 See Walton, supra note 104, at 259, 271, 276–77, 285, 288. Failing to be 
neutral while representing multiple clients may trigger liability for the lawyer. 
See Nelson Bros. Prof’l Real Estate, LLC v. Freeborn & Peters, LLP, 773 F.3d 
853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that, where a lawyer structured a joint 
venture agreement allowing one client to outvote the second client without in-
forming the second client, the firm was liable for malpractice); Crest Inv. Trust, 
Inc. v. Comstock, 327 A.2d 891, 901, 904 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (holding 
that fiduciary duties were breached when the lawyer, representing the bank 
and farmers in investment and business formation, allowed farmers to enter into 
investment that favored the bank without recommending that farmers seek 
independent counsel). 
111 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7; see also infra notes 125–26 
and accompanying text. 
112 See Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Ap-
proaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1265–
66 (1994) (recommending better clarity within the rules); Stephen Doherty, 
Comment, Joint Representation Conflicts of Interests: Toward a More Balanced 
Approach, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 561, 581–82 (1992) (describing the interplay be-
tween Rules 1.7 and 1.9). 
113 See, e.g., Bruce Alan Mann & Marcus D. Wilkinson, The Role of Counsel in 
Venture Capital Transactions if Disputes Arise, 46 BUS. LAW. 759, 767 (1991). 
114 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (2015). 
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C. Founder Drift 
Whether a founder leaves the original group prior to the es-
tablishment of a structured, formal organization because of dis-
agreement, a loss of interest, or the emergence of a better project 
elsewhere, the attorney representing the group of founders faces 
the same decision point: may she remain with the enterprise absent 
one of the founders without that leaving founder’s permission? 
1. The Propriety of Continuing Representation 
Before we reach that question, a preliminary consideration war-
rants our attention. One might suggest that whenever the group 
of founders reconstitutes, or whenever one of its members drifts 
away, the law firm ought to withdraw from representation and 
refer the enterprise to new counsel.115 This inquiry will resurface 
when we reach the setting of an active business, with the founders 
as partners opting to leave.116 It is seemingly safer and more con-
servative for a law firm to refrain from representing the group of 
founders after the membership within the group has changed. 
That strategy will not always be the best alternative, however. 
There are three considerations that might support a law firm’s 
remaining as counsel to the inchoate enterprise after a founder 
departs. First, with startup businesses, it is not infrequently the 
case that the founder group is fluid, with some entrepreneurs 
joining a team for a while and then reassessing the best use of 
their scarce time, especially in light of the lack of wages or salary 
in this early stage of the inchoate business.117 If the law firm de-
sires to stay with the business, and the remaining founders desire 
to continue, it is not fair to the emerging business to require its 
locating new counsel and a reprise of the informed consent dance. 
Second, if the law firm is offering its services pro bono, which is 
                                                                                                            
115 Some participants suggested this remedy during the Boston College Law 
School summer colloquium discussion of this paper. 
116 See infra notes 217–53 and accompanying text. 
117 “It is an unfortunate truth, but very often the team that first embarks on 
a startup concept is not the same team to finish.” Matt Faustman, Founders Leaving 
the Startup, UPCOUNSEL: BLOG, https://www.upcounsel.com/blog/founders-leav 
ing-the-startup [https://perma.cc/SDS3-EL5Y]. 
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not uncommon with inchoate startup businesses,118 there may not 
be other counsel available. 
Third, many law firms offer services to cash-strapped startup 
enterprises through an arrangement of deferred fee payments119 
or a promised share in the equity of the later business.120 In those 
settings, a shift in the array of founders that does not appear to 
alter the scope of the ongoing business plan would leave the firm 
anxious to remain as counsel. If that incentive is not shared by 
the founders, a conflict of interest would appear to arise between 
the interests of the firm and the interest of the founder cli-
ents121—a conflict that the law firm needs to address in a trans-
parent way.122 But, often the remaining founders are more than 
happy not to have to change firms,123 so the interests of the firm 
and the remaining clients would align. 
                                                                                                            
118 Pro bono legal services for transactional clients, most often startups, is 
more prevalent than in the past. See James L. Baillie, Fulfilling the Promise of 
Business Law Pro Bono, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1543, 1544, 1568 (2002); 
Thomas H. Morsch, Discovering Transactional Pro Bono, 72 UMKC L. REV. 
423, 425, 431 (2003). 
119 See Sarah Boulden, Note, The Business of StartUp Law: Alternative Fee 
Arrangements and Agency Costs in Entrepreneurial Law, 11 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 279, 294 (2013) (reporting that the Cooley and Moye White law 
firms employ that practice). 
120 For a discussion of the practice of law firms taking equity in startup 
clients, see generally John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in 
Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
405 (2002); Jason M. Klein, No Fool for a Client: The Finance and Incentives 
Behind Stock-Based Compensation for Corporate Attorneys, 1999 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 329 (1999); Casey Perrino, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: What to 
Do When One Must Take Equity in a Client, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 825 
(2015); Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99 
(2001); Gwyneth E. McAlpine, Comment, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should 
Lawyers Be Allowed to Invest in Their Clients’ Stock?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 549 
(1999); Thomas E. Przybylski, Note, The Ethics of Accepting Stock in a Client 
as Payment for Legal Services, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1431 (2002). 
121 See Donald C. Langevoort, When Lawyers and Law Firms Invest in Their 
Corporate Clients’ Stock, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 574 (2002) (describing the some-
times distorted perceptions of lawyers in assessing those risks); Perrino, supra 
note 120, at 834–35 (discussing the conflicts that arise when taking equity). 
122 See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. 
123 See Mann & Wilkinson, supra note 113, at 775. 
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For these reasons, we should acknowledge that at times the 
firm and the remaining founders will hope to continue to work 
together, and assess the ethical and logistical complications of 
their doing so. 
2. Founder Mobility Resulting from Conflict 
Let us return to our original story and introduce founder mobil-
ity. Imagine that after the law firm has accepted the joint represen-
tation of Janelle, Arjun, and Netia, the team encounters serious 
internal conflict about how the enterprise will proceed, with 
Janelle and Arjun disagreeing with the strategic visions of Netia. 
The efforts of Sofia Schendel, the joint clients’ counsel, to mediate 
their differences do not succeed, and she concludes that she cannot 
continue to represent the group of three clients. However, she hopes 
to continue to work with Janelle and Arjun as they continue with 
the business ideas. Imagine further that Netia ignores Sofia’s re-
quests for explicit permission for Sofia to continue to work with the 
other two original founders. 
Once Netia is no longer a client, she becomes a former client of 
the law firm, and the question of any proceeding representation is 
addressed by Model Rule 1.9.124 Rule 1.9 would prohibit the rep-
resentation by the law firm of clients (here, Janelle and Arjun) if 
that representation is substantially related to that of a former cli-
ent (here, Netia) and is adverse to the interests of the now-former 
client.125 If those conditions are met, the law firm may proceed only 
if Netia provides informed consent to the continued representa-
tion, confirmed in writing.126 
In this story, the ongoing representation is substantially re-
lated to the firm’s work for Netia; indeed, it is the same work as 
that performed by the law firm for Netia, and the firm likely ob-
tained material confidential information from Netia while acting 
as her lawyer.127 The critical question is whether continued rep-
resentation of the “business” through Janelle and Arjun would be 
                                                                                                            
124 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (2015). 
125 See id. 
126 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 
cmt. d(iii) (2000). 
127 It is not implausible to imagine that the law firm, while representing 
Janelle, Arjun, and Netia, learned virtually nothing from Netia, having had most 
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considered adverse to Netia. “Material adversity,” as the Rule 1.9 
requirement has come to be known,128 tests the degree to which 
the current representation may result in legal, financial, or other 
identifiable detriment to the former client.129 There can be no 
blanket application of the adversity condition, as it is entirely 
fact-driven.130 If, after the law firm withdraws from its common 
representation of Janelle, Arjun, and Netia, Netia does not pur-
sue the enterprise for which the group formed, then the law firm 
seems quite safe in accepting a retainer from Janelle and Arjun 
to continue the business. 
If, on the other hand, the law firm learns that Netia will pur-
sue a similar enterprise on her own or with new collaborators, the 
law firm’s predicament is more delicate if it hopes to continue with 
Janelle and Arjun. There is no direct authority on which the law firm 
may rely,131 but some principles provide guidance. First, even the 
more strict concurrent representation conflict of interest author-
ity, Model Rule 1.7,132 permits a law firm to represent competitors 
                                                                                                            
communications with Janelle and Arjun. If that were true, is the law firm never-
theless forbidden by Rule 1.9 from proceeding without the consent of Netia be-
cause of the absence of any protected confidences? The answer appears to be 
yes—the bar to representation remains. The “substantial relationship” test 
within Rule 1.9 presumes the receipt of relevant information if the two matters 
are substantially related. See DEBORAH L. RHODE ET AL., LEGAL ETHICS 532 (7th 
ed. 2016); Doherty, supra note 112, at 582. 
128 RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 (2000); LISA 
G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
492 (3d ed. 2012). 
129 See ABA & BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, INC., 18 LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON 
PROF’L CONDUCT 205, 220–21 (2002). 
130 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 2 (2015). 
131 Authority supports the proposition that founders have fiduciary relation-
ships to one another and the yet-to-be-formed business entity, but these authori-
ties do not specifically address the application of these duties if Netia competes 
with Janelle and Arjun, or how an attorney should ethically handle these situ-
ations. See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS COUNSELOR’S LAW AND COMPLIANCE 
PRACTICE MANUAL § 9:6 (2014); ALAN S. GUTTERMAN & JEAN L. BATMAN, 1 CAL. 
TRANSACTIONS FORMS—BUS. ENTITIES § 3.2 (2016). 
132 Rule 1.7 is stricter in its limitation on conflicts of interest in that, unlike 
Rule 1.9, it forbids opposing a second client even if the matters are entirely 
unrelated. See Kristi N. Saylors, Conflicts of Interest in Family Law, 28 FAM. 
L.Q. 451, 472 (1994) (“Model Rule 1.7 applies a stricter standard to conflicts 
with current clients than to conflicts with former clients (Model Rule 1.9)”). 
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within the same industry “whose interests are only economically 
adverse.”133 Therefore, the fact that a former client enters the 
same field as a competitor should not demand the law firm refrain 
from representation of the remaining founders.134 On the other 
hand, if Netia competes with Janelle and Arjun, and if the law 
firm concludes that Janelle and Arjun will employ in a significant 
fashion the confidential insights from Netia in their business 
model, a different result seems appropriate. Exploiting the former 
client’s confidential information to that client’s detriment is ex-
actly what Rule 1.9(a) intends to prevent.135 That would suggest 
that Sofia decline further representation of Janelle and Arjun 
(and any other founder joining them to replace Netia). 
That conclusion, while prudent, nevertheless remains a little 
puzzling. The purpose of Rule 1.9 is to protect Netia’s confidences. 
While labeled most often as a conflicts rule, Rule 1.9 serves most 
directly to protect the confidences of former clients.136 That is the 
driving rationale for the application of the substantial relation-
ship test. While it may be the case that Janelle and Arjun have 
used information belonging to Netia in the crafting of their busi-
ness model, that sharing does not preclude Janelle and Arjun 
from locating a new, separate law firm and proceeding with their 
conception of the business.137 If that is true, and if it also happens 
to be true that the current law firm has no personal information 
from Netia that Janelle and Arjun do not have available to them 
(again, quite likely), why should Janelle and Arjun change firms? 
The only rationale justifying the firm’s disqualification from 
continuing to represent Janelle and Arjun would be what we 
                                                                                                            
133 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 6. 
134 Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 8. 
135 See id. r. 1.9 cmts. 1, 9; see also Douglas R. Richmond, Choosing Sides: 
Issue or Positional Conflicts of Interest, 51 FLA. L. REV. 383, 395–96 (1999); 
John W. Allen, Conflicts of Interest—The Basics, 78 MICH. B.J. 180, 181 (1999). 
136 See RHODE ET AL., supra note 127, at 472; Richmond, supra note 135, at 396; 
Neil W. Hamilton & Kevin R. Coan, Are We a Profession or Merely a Business?: 
The Erosion of the Conflicts Rules Through the Increased Use of Ethical Walls, 
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 71 (1998). 
137 This conclusion seems inescapable. If Janelle and Arjun, after the com-
mon representation we have been considering here has concluded, approach a 
new law firm for representation of their emerging business, that new law firm 
may certainly accept that representation, having no connection at all to Netia. 
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might call the Brennan’s, Inc. theory, and that justification, while 
weak, is not necessarily incoherent. In the well-known Brennan’s, 
Inc. case, a law firm simultaneously represented two restaurateur 
brothers, each with a separate business organization, within the 
Brennan family in New Orleans.138 When the collaboration ended 
after one brother established a competing restaurant using the 
family logo, the law firm remained as counsel to that brother.139 
In responding to a motion to disqualify the law firm, based on 
doctrine that later emerged as Rule 1.9, the firm argued that it 
was in no more advantageous posture than any new law firm would 
be, and therefore should not be disqualified.140 Because any confi-
dential client information the former counsel had access to would be 
available to the successor firm, given that joint clients regularly 
share information, the former counsel had obtained no advantage 
that could conceivably cause harm to the former client.141 The 
Fifth Circuit acknowledged that argument but disqualified the 
firm nevertheless, reading a loyalty component into the Rule 1.9 
doctrine along with a confidentiality component.142 Because the 
two brothers’ restaurants were competitors, and, because each 
wanted to use the Brennan’s logo, it was impermissibly disloyal 
for the firm to choose which of the family factions—that is to say 
which of its former clients—it would support.143 
The Brennan’s, Inc. ruling remains good law, despite its ques-
tionable logic.144 That doctrine would deny Sofia the opportunity 
to work with Janelle and Arjun after Netia leaves without waiving 
any former client conflict if the adversity condition was satisfied. 
                                                                                                            
138 Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rests., Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 170–71 (5th Cir. 
1979). Brennan’s, Inc. appears in several law school Professional Responsibility 
textbooks; see generally, GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., LAW AND ETHICS OF LAW-
YERING 457 (5th ed. 2010); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN & DAVID B. WILKINS, PROBLEMS 
IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING PROFESSION 95–98 (4th ed. 
2002); LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 128, at 502. 
139 Brennan’s, Inc., 590 F.2d at 171. 
140 Id. at 174. 
141 Id. at 173. 
142 Id. at 172. 
143 Id. 
144 The result in Brennan’s, Inc. follows from a direct application of the sub-
stantial relationship test of Rule 1.9. The Restatement also relies on the Brennan’s, 
Inc. opinion in support of its interpretation of former client conflicts of interest. 
See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 cmt. g (2000). 
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The adversity factor is essential.145 In Brennan’s, Inc., the two for-
merly represented brothers’ businesses competed directly, and each 
wanted access to the logo in question, so adversity was strongly 
evident.146 In the scenario considered here, no business activity 
exists yet with any of the founders, and Netia may or may not 
succeed in establishing an ongoing enterprise. Perhaps that dif-
ference would permit the firm to continue representing the re-
maining founders even without the waiver, but little reported 
substantive authority is available to support that proposition.147 
One last observation warrants a brief discussion here before the 
analysis moves on to consideration of a less contentious change of 
client personnel. The above discussion assumes that the jurisdic-
tion in question does not adhere to the rather quirky Jesse v. 
Danforth doctrine. In Jesse, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held 
that a group of founders working with a law firm to establish a 
business entity, while apparently individual joint clients during 
the formation stage, retroactively convert to constituents of the 
entity—instead of former clients of the firm—after the entity has 
been established.148 Therefore, as occurred in Jesse, the firm may 
represent another client on a substantially related matter con-
trary to the interests of one of the founders without that founder’s 
consent.149 Jesse is not followed in all states,150 and its holding 
                                                                                                            
145 See id.; see also Brennan’s, Inc., 590 F.2d at 172 (“A client would feel 
wronged if an opponent prevailed against him with the aid of an attorney who 
formally represented the client in the same matter.”).  
146 See Brennan’s, Inc., 590 F.2d at 170. 
147 See generally Lemaire v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308 (1980) (holding that 
plaintiff’s counsel was not disqualified by hiring a new attorney who previously 
worked for defendant’s law firm since the new attorney refused to discuss the 
case with firm members, and the difficult nature of the case would make it hard 
to locate other qualified counsel); Rohm & Haas Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 187 
F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.N.J. 2001) (finding that although adversity existed between 
the parties, a significant delay in moving for disqualification constituted waiver); 
In re Texas Windstorm Ins. Ass’n, 417 S.W.3d 119 (Tex. App. 2013) (holding 
that no adversity existed between association and former client of attorney 
since former client was not a current party to consolidated lawsuit). 
148 Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1992). 
149 See id. at 68–69. 
150 A federal court in Minnesota, ruling on a dispute involving a Florida cor-
poration, followed Jesse’s retroactivity analysis. See Manion v. Nagin, 394 F.3d 
1062, 1069–70 (8th Cir. 2005). Delaware has declined to follow the Jesse reason-
ing. See, e.g., Opdyke v. Kent Liquor Mart, Inc., 181 A.2d 579, 583–85 (Del. 1962). 
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has not been adopted by the Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers.151 If it were the law in this firm’s state, however, the 
above analysis might change.152 
3. Founder Mobility Resulting from Drift 
The fact that startups often begin with a loose coalition of ac-
tors developing an idea means that from time to time the consti-
tution of the founding group will evolve, with some participants 
drifting away to other projects and new helpers showing up.153 
That “drift” phenomenon has important consequences for the law 
firm. Once the firm has identified its joint clients, and has entered 
into formal written retainer agreements with them, a change in 
the composition of the group requires a corresponding reworking 
of the retainers.154 The new retainer also triggers the need to review 
the informed consent agreement regarding the joint representation, 
especially (but seemingly not solely) for any newly engaged jointly 
represented client.155 The firm also ought to formally end the rep-
resentation agreement with the departing member of the entre-
preneurial team.156 
With “drift,” in contrast to the explicit disagreement among 
the founders discussed above, the firm typically has less to worry 
about its continued representation of the remaining founders. The 
absence of disagreement does not mean that the firm can simply 
forget about or ignore the interests of the drifting-away entrepreneur, 
                                                                                                            
151 See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. d 
(2000) (describing Jesse as “consistent with the Section and Comment,” but not 
adopting the retroactivity principle). 
152 It is not self-evident that the analysis would change in a Jesse jurisdic-
tion, however. The Jesse principle would necessarily hold that during the pre-
incorporation representation the individuals who later, after incorporation, will 
retroactively become non-clients will be full clients until that time. Otherwise, 
if those persons never had individual client status, the “retroactivity” notion 
would have no meaning. See Jesse, 485 N.W.2d at 67–68; J. S. Nelson, The 
Corporate Conspiracy Vacuum, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 297 (2015). 
153 See Faustman, supra note 117. 
154 See RUPA § 801 cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997) 
(“Even if the business of the partnership is continued by some of the partners, 
it is technically a new partnership.”). 
155 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 2 (2015). 
156 Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 4 (“If a conflict arises after representation has been under-
taken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation[.]”). 
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however. A participant who served as a client for a period of time 
and then stops working with the team because of a change in 
plans or a loss of interest may nevertheless still have some claims 
to the fruits of the resulting enterprise.157 The firm must address 
those possible rights, both in its communication with the depart-
ing founder and in its renewed agreement with the remaining 
founders.158 The fact that the departing founder may have some 
claims to share in the resulting success of the enterprise does not 
inherently present any conflict of interest for the firm’s ongoing 
work, as the success of the startup benefits the former client as 
well as the ongoing clients.159 Therefore, no waiver of conflicts by 
the former or current clients would be necessary except in two 
circumstances: (1) the continued business would compete directly 
with the drifting founder,160 or (2) the remaining founders cannot 
agree on the share of the enterprise to which the departing founder 
will later be entitled.161 
The first of those two circumstances puts the law firm in the 
same posture as when the departing founder leaves because of a 
disagreement, as explored above. The second circumstance places 
the law firm in a challenging position. To appreciate that difficulty, 
imagine this example: Janelle, Arjun, and Netia, the three founders 
of the inchoate business, retain Sofia and her law firm for common 
representation, and the firm agrees to represent the three entre-
preneurs individually. After the team has worked together for a few 
weeks, Netia gradually but noticeably stops participating in the 
group’s planning and development. Efforts by the remaining team 
members to reengage Netia do not succeed. The team finally agrees 
that it ought to replace Netia with a new team member, Rica. 
The law firm’s response ought to be to confirm with Netia, in 
writing, her choice to leave the team and the consequential cessation 
                                                                                                            
157 See Ale & McKinney, supra note 8, at 479–80. 
158 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 2. 
159 Id. r. 1.7(b)(3). 
160 The analysis in the text assumes that in the “drift” context the departing 
founder simply moves on to other activities, which contrasts with the situation 
discussed earlier where an irreconcilable difference arises, requiring the joint rep-
resentation to cease. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. Of course, that 
assumption may not apply to some of the drift settings, so the earlier disagreement-
driven analysis could apply in this setting as well. 
161 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4). 
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of the representation.162 The firm must also counsel Rica, along 
with the remaining original founders, about the implications of the 
new joint representation agreement among Janelle, Arjun, and 
Rica.163 Those two activities relate, in this way: the informed con-
sent discussion surrounding the joint representation including 
Rica inevitably invites consideration of the remaining interests (if 
any) of Netia, the law firm’s former client. Sofia, the lawyer coun-
seling the team about the new joint representation, must not under-
mine her former client’s interests during that deliberation. In fact, 
Sofia might choose, in her confirming letter or email to Netia, to 
explicate the rights and interests Netia continues to possess, or 
might continue to possess, in the team’s enterprise.164 The remain-
ing members of the team might prefer that the lawyer not inform 
the departing founder of any such interests, but that preference 
cannot affect the lawyer’s responsibilities to her former client.165 
If the lawyer and the remaining team members disagree about 
the rights and interests of Netia, the lawyer’s response to that 
disagreement will depend on the clarity and soundness of Netia’s 
                                                                                                            
162 Rule 1.16 applies whenever a lawyer stops representation prior to its 
natural completion, and its permissive withdrawal provisions would most likely 
operate here. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(6) (stating that 
attorney withdrawal is permitted when “the representation ... has been ren-
dered unreasonably difficult by the client”). The “drift” story resembles (but is 
also distinctly different from) the situation where a lawyer loses contact with 
a client in the middle of a matter. At least two state bar ethics committees have 
addressed the responsibilities of a lawyer whose client has disappeared. See 
Alaska Ethics Op. 2011-4, 2011 WL 2410520 (2011), https://www.alaskabar.org 
/servlet/content/11_4.html [https://perma.cc/5V9N-T4JM] (requiring a “reasonable 
inquiry”); Ill. St. Bar Ass’n Advisory Opinion on Prof’l Conduct No. 03-04 (2004) 
(advising the lawyer to “use due diligence in conducting an investigation” to 
locate the client or the needed facts if the representation must proceed); see 
also Karen Erger, The Client that Got Away, 92 ILL. B.J. 433 (2004); Allison E. 
Williams, Missing Clients: What to Do When Your Client Has Vanished, 28 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 247 (2004). 
163 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 29. 
164 As the above discussion indicated, the “drift” scenario finds the law firm 
withdrawing, permissibly, from an ongoing representation. Rule 1.16(d) states 
that the “lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect 
[the] client’s interests” upon such termination of representation. MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(d). That obligation arguably requires the lawyer to 
inform his client of her status as a former member of the founders’ team. 
165 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(d). 
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interests notwithstanding her having drifted away. If Netia’s in-
terests in the ultimate business enterprise are not clearly assured 
under the circumstances, which is not at all unlikely,166 then the 
lawyer may proceed with her representation of the remaining found-
ers without advising Netia that she might have some later claims 
to some stake in the business.167 If Netia possesses clear interests, 
but the remaining founders prefer that the lawyer withhold that 
information from Netia, then a conflict exists that might require 
the joint representation to end.168 
                                                                                                            
166 Netia’s arguments that she is entitled to share in the success of the re-
sulting enterprise after having participated at the earliest stages of the busi-
ness’s development, and having voluntarily drifted away before the business 
began operations, are not self-evidently strong. Her rights under partnership 
law (if the enterprise qualified as one, which it does not) would be limited, so 
her rights without partnership entitlements would be even less. Under RUPA, 
Netia would be entitled to a fair distribution of her share of the partnership 
net assets at the time she departs. See RUPA §§ 601(7), 603, 701, 801(1) (NAT’L 
CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). If she has departed before the part-
nership has any measurable value, her later claims to a share of increased 
value would have little chance of success. For her copyright interests, see infra 
note 284 and accompanying text. 
167 The lawyer in this story has three possible choices in her Rule 1.16–
generated communication with Netia: (1) actively encourage Netia to pursue 
claims that might have merit; (2) advise Netia that she may, but also may not, 
have claims, but the lawyer may not advocate for or against Netia on that ques-
tion; or (3) omit any mention of possible claims. Option (1) is simply not ac-
ceptable, as it favors one of the original joint clients over the others—a stance 
the lawyer committed to avoid when she accepted the common representation 
originally. The remaining founders prefer Option (3), of course. Sofia will also 
prefer Option (3) (since she continues to represent the remaining founders, but 
not Netia), and she will choose it if it is an ethically proper alternative. It ap-
pears to be ethically proper. Because it is not certain that Netia has any viable 
claims at all, and because Sofia’s joint representation agreement requires that 
she use her best efforts to maintain a careful neutrality among her several 
clients, no authority would condemn the lawyer for a failure to upset the deli-
cate balance by encouraging her now-former client to pursue claims that her 
current clients hope will not be pursued. See Marc Pilcher, Note, “You’re Kill-
ing Independent George”: When Professionalism and Business Worlds Collide, 
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 829, 834 (1999) (describing the duties owed to former 
clients after joint representation). 
168 Because of the usual requirement that the lawyer share information 
among jointly represented clients, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 
cmt. 31 (2015), the law firm may have an obligation not just to withdraw from 
the common representation, but to share with Rica information about the strat-
egy learned from the remaining founders. AM. C. OF TR. & EST. COUNS. FOUND., 
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III. REPRESENTING FOUNDERS OF ACTIVE FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISES 
It is surely true that in some representational contexts involving 
multiple founders, but not all such contexts, the group of founders 
will constitute a partnership.169 The lawyer will typically encounter 
a mutually exclusive choice: either her group constitutes a partner-
ship, or not, with no intermediate alternative available. Part III 
examines the ethical responsibilities of the lawyer when she con-
cludes that the group with whom she works qualifies as a part-
nership. Those responsibilities will be different in some important 
ways from her duties in working with multiple individuals. 
A. Discerning When the Group Qualifies as a Partnership 
Because it matters in significant ways, the lawyer ought to be 
able to determine whether Janelle, Arjun, and Netia are partners, 
or not. We encountered this question above,170 and that discussion 
concluded that while the choice may be mutually exclusive, it is 
not always self-evident. In some settings the partnership quali-
ties will be clear. If the business is operational, directed by more 
than one founder, with contributions from those directing found-
ers, and an agreement for shared ownership and responsibility for 
the profits (when they come) and losses, the lawyer ought to pro-
ceed as though she has encountered a partnership by operation of 
law.171 If the business is not yet operational, but merely a brain-
storm that awaits development with no intentions yet to share 
profits and losses, the lawyer may assume with little risk that the 
founders come to her as individuals.172 
In many settings, especially with nascent startup operations, it 
will not be clear to the lawyer which category best fits the activity 
she observes. Commentators often note the lack of precision in the 
                                                                                                            
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 75 (4th ed. 2006); see 
also Kevin H. Michels, What Conflicts Can Be Waived? A Unified Understand-
ing of Competence and Consent, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 109, 164 (2012). 
169 Darby, supra note 39, at 326 (“One must look to the intent of the parties, 
the facts of the association, the rights of the parties, and profit-sharing to de-
termine on a case-by-case basis if a partnership does exist.”). 
170 See supra notes 29–41 and accompanying text. 
171 HURT ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.05. 
172 Id. § 2.06. 
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substantive law regarding whether a partnership exists or not,173 
so it is no surprise that a lawyer at the early stages of an enterprise 
will experience that uncertainty. In the face of ambiguity, the lawyer 
ought to err on the side of treating the participants as individuals. 
One might suggest that in those ambiguous contexts the law-
yer and the founders simply should negotiate among themselves 
and choose the favored categorization, with a retainer agreement 
memorializing that choice. That suggestion fails for two reasons. 
First, the counseling process and the lawyering work needed to 
discern the best way to proceed require that the lawyer already 
have some client relationship with the participants,174 so the sug-
gestion is, in that way, question-begging. Presumably, the group 
will soon enough select some formal entity through which to con-
duct the business, so the questions we face here apply only to the 
earliest stages of the lawyer’s work with the participants.175 Sec-
ond, it is not entirely clear that the founders may autonomously 
choose a category if the underlying substantive law does not sup-
port it, and such an election might introduce subtle risks to the 
participants if they ultimately make the wrong choice.176 
Instead, the lawyer must discern independently, using her best 
legal judgment, whether to proceed as though the founders are 
individuals or an entity. A prudent lawyer will discuss this onto-
logical puzzle with the founders, and she will likely explain how 
the group’s later agreements will resolve any present ambiguities. 
Where she is not entirely sure which category best fits, she ought 
to err on the side of no partnership. One reason for this conclusion 
is that the substantive law of partnership presumes no partner-
ship.177 A participant who claims to be a partner bears the burden 
                                                                                                            
173 Id. § 2.01(A); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 104; see also Anthony J. Luppino, 
Fixing a Hole: Eliminating Ownership Uncertainties to Facilitate University-
Generated Innovation, 78 UMKC L. REV. 367, 404–18 (2009). 
174 See Burman, Forming the Lawyer-Client Relationship, supra note 6, at 
46–47. 
175 Id. at 48–49. 
176 For instance, if the participants opt to proceed for the time being as if 
they constituted a partnership, but they were not in fact a partnership, some 
founders might have relied on commitments that may not be enforceable. See, 
e.g., Fenwick v. Unemp. Compensation Comm’n, 44 A.2d 172, 174–75 (N.J. 
1945) (holding no partnership existed despite participants using that term). 
177 HURT ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.02(B); but see id. § 2.07(A)–(C). 
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of proving each of the partnership elements.178 The other reason 
for the lawyer to treat the founders as individual clients when she is 
uncertain of the application of partnership law principles is grounded 
in the strategic planning insight that recommends keeping as many 
options open as possible or, put another way, seeking to foreclose 
as few options as possible.179 The individual client model does not 
foreclose any structuring that the participants might desire, while 
a partnership model imposes default obligations that might be in-
appropriate for the group.180 
B. How the Partnership Identity Affects the Firm’s Responsibility 
Let us turn to those settings where the lawyer is sufficiently 
confident that the group of founders is indeed a partnership, even 
if the founders do not yet know that fact.181 The next undertaking 
for the law firm is to articulate how representation of a partner-
ship, at the startup level, is different in a substantive way from 
representation of the individual founders who possess only an in-
choate business idea. We begin with an elementary legal ethics 
principle: the representation of a partnership does not mean rep-
resentation of the individual partners, absent a separate agree-
ment.182 As we shall see in a moment, this fundamental precept 
is not as well-established or accepted as some authorities might 
                                                                                                            
178 Id. § 2.02(B); Woods v. Wills, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1185 (E.D. Mo. 2005). 
Where partnership must be established by operation of law, proof must be by 
“‘clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the purported partners have made 
a definite and specific agreement.’” Id. (quoting Morrison v. Labor and Indus. 
Relations Comm’n, 23 S.W.3d 902, 909 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)). 
179 See GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS 
FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 298 (1978). 
180 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 125–33 (describing capital contribu-
tion requirements, division of profits and losses, and liability responsibilities 
that accompany default partnerships). 
181 See Luppino, supra note 173, at 408 (discussing “[a]ccidental or [i]ll-
[d]efined [p]artnerships” and “the possibility of accidental or inadvertent crea-
tion of a partnership”). 
182 The ABA treats “a lawyer who represents a partnership” as representing 
“the entity rather than the individual partners,” stating that “[b]oth case au-
thority and commentary support the treatment of partnerships as entities sep-
arate from their owners” for purposes of the attorney-client relationship. ABA 
Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361 (1991); see also 
Keatinge, supra note 6, at 391–92. 
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imply, but it states a fundamental guiding principle.183 It is the 
primary difference between the inchoate setting and the active 
business setting.184 
If the law firm agrees to represent the partnership, and if the 
partnership qualifies as an entity,185 then the firm would identify 
the client as the entity (the business) operating as a partnership.186 
The firm would then proceed by analogy to any other entity that it 
represented, using the guidance of Model Rule 1.13.187 The indi-
viduals would not be clients of the firm (absent some separate agree-
ment for a separate individually driven legal matter),188 and the 
direction for the legal work would come from the “duly authorized 
constituents.”189 In theory at least, the firm could choose to oppose 
any of the founders in an adversary proceeding so long as that 
new action did not hamper the firm’s work for the entity.190 Artic-
ulating that scenario shows its unlikelihood in the context of a 
small startup, but conceptually it is basically a sound proposition. 
Representing the partnership entity rather than the three found-
ers as joint clients would be easier in this way: the firm would not 
need to obtain informed consent to the joint representation, although 
                                                                                                            
183 See Keatinge, supra note 6, at 391–94. 
184 Unlike startups, active businesses usually retain independent counsel to 
represent the entire entity. See John M. Cunningham, Helping Businesses Get 
Started, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov.–Dec. 1995, at  9–12 (discussing unique legal chal-
lenges faced by startups). 
185 See, e.g., Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1994) (“There is no 
logical reason to distinguish partnerships from corporations or other legal en-
tities in determining the client a lawyer represents.”) (quoting ABA Comm’n 
on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361 (1991)). 
186 The fact that the business may not yet have a name, or any other coherent 
identity beyond the founders’ work together, does not matter for present purposes. 
The firm would need to determine how to refer to this client in its database. 
187 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (2015). 
188 Rule 1.13 confirms that a lawyer who represents an organization may 
also represent one or more of its constituents on an individual basis, as long as 
no disabling conflict of interest arises by virtue of the dual representation. See 
id. r. 1.13(a), (g); Frank Settelmeyer & Sons, Inc. v. Smith & Harmer, Ltd., 197 
P.3d 1051, 1059 (Nev. 2008) (finding no conflict of interest in representing cor-
poration and majority shareholder in dissolution action); Campbell v. McKeon, 
905 N.Y.S.2d 589, 591 (App. Div. 2010) (similar to the court in Smith & Harmer). 
189 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a). 
190 See Responsible Citizens v. Super. Ct. of Fresno, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 
766–67 (1993). 
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the firm would have a duty to share information with all of the 
founders if the entity were a true partnership, as this discussion 
assumes it is.191 The firm would need to explain to the partners 
the distinction between individual representation and entity rep-
resentation, with any “corporate Miranda warnings” contemplated 
by Rule 1.13(f),192 as well as the need for information-sharing 
among the partners.193 But the responsibility would be to inform 
the constituents, and not to obtain any consent from them as a 
condition of proceeding.194 If any constituent did not like what she 
or he heard, the only remedy would be for the entity to decline the 
representation—but, of course, any other lawyer would be in pre-
cisely the same situation, so the entity does not have a “choice” 
between these conditions.195 
A second significant difference between joint representation and 
entity representation appears in consideration of decision-making 
protocols. If the firm represented all three founders as joint cli-
ents, the firm could not implement a legal strategy if one of the 
                                                                                                            
191 A lawyer for a general partnership ordinarily has a duty to share rele-
vant information with the partners, even if she does not represent the partners 
personally. See RUPA § 403(c) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997); 
see also Wortham & Van Liew v. Super. Ct. of San Diego, 223 Cal. Rptr. 725, 
728–29 (1987) (holding the lawyer must disclose to third partner all infor-
mation regarding the partnership, when lawyer represented a three-member 
partnership); Birmingham Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 87-7 (1987); 
Thomas E. Rutledge & Phuc H. Lu, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Pitfalls 
for Counsel to a Business Organization About to Be Governed by a New Law, 
45 BRANDEIS L.J. 755, 777–78 (2007). 
192 Rule 1.13(f) requires that a lawyer representing an organization “explain 
the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that 
the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom 
the lawyer is dealing.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(f); see also 
United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 604–05 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing this 
as a “so-called Upjohn or corporate Miranda warning”). 
193 Nothing in Rule 1.13(f) requires, by that rule’s language, an explanation 
about the lawyer’s responsibility to share partnership information with all part-
ners, but the analogy to that similar duty with joint clients is plain. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 31; see also supra notes 90–94 and ac-
companying text (explaining that a lawyer who did not give notice to the partners 
of the plan to share information would not have acted as a prudent representative 
of the entity client). 
194 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmts. 18, 19, 31 (discussing in-
formed consent). 
195 Id. 
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clients opposed that strategy, because of the firm’s unalloyed loy-
alty to each client.196 In representation of an entity, by contrast, 
a firm may implement a strategy over the objections of one of the 
constituents, as long as the entity’s “duly authorized constituents” 
approve the strategy.197 In this way, entity representation is, con-
ceptually at least, easier for the law firm than joint representation 
because the lawyers need not worry about having to withdraw 
from all representations if the founders disagree. But “easier” is 
not the same as “easy.” With partnerships by default, discerning a 
decision-making structure is not self-evident.198 Nor is determin-
ing who serves as the entity’s “duly authorized constituents.”199 
According to RUPA, management of a partnership operates through 
majority rule of the partners.200 Therefore, absent an agreement 
otherwise (and in the settings we consider here, by default there 
is unlikely to be any such agreement), the firm has the authority 
and the duty to implement the decisions of two of the three part-
ners notwithstanding the disagreement of the third.201 
C. Partner Mobility: Drift and Breakdown 
With founders who are deemed to be partners, just as with 
those who are an aggregate of individuals, the prospect of fluidity 
remains real.202 The lawyer’s response to a partner leaving, either 
                                                                                                            
196 See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. This hypothetical assumes 
there is no binding, articulated agreement among the founders for a decision-
making protocol. 
197 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a). 
198 Because default partnerships arise without any planning or necessary 
forethought by the partners, the chances are high that no decision-making pro-
tocol will have been chosen by the team members. See Rutledge & Lu, supra 
note 191, at 772–75 (describing the client in a partnership). 
199 Id. at 770–72 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (1982, 
amended 1989)). 
200 RUPA § 407(j) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997) (“A difference 
arising as to a matter in the ordinary course of business of a partnership may 
be decided by a majority of the partners.”); see generally Claudia M. Landeo & 
Kathryn E. Spier, Shotguns and Deadlocks, 31 YALE J. REG. 143 (2014). 
201 See Casey Ranch Ltd. P’ship v. Casey, 773 N.W.2d 816, 821 (S.D. 2009) 
(acknowledging that the default rule is that a majority controls); Covalt v. High, 
675 P.2d 999, 1002 (N.M. 1983) (finding made under the New Mexico Uniform 
Partnership Act). 
202 See generally Ale & McKinney, supra note 8. 
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because of drift or because of active disagreement, will be different 
when the representation involves a partnership. 
While the departure of one joint client participating in an 
emerging startup creates complications for the firm, and may deny 
the firm the privilege of continuing with the remaining founders, 
the departure of an entity constituent does not so directly affect 
the representation, assuming (and this is a critical assumption) 
that the partnership continues its enterprise through the remaining 
partners. That conclusion follows from the essential understanding 
of representing an entity. The departure of a shareholder from an 
established corporation does not affect the firm’s continued repre-
sentation of the corporation if the board so chooses.203 Similarly, the 
departure of a member from an LLC has no direct effect on any 
ongoing legal work if the managers desire the continued repre-
sentation.204 Therefore, entity representation would appear to of-
fer the firm a more stable basis for uninterrupted production of 
assigned legal work from the business. 
With a general partnership, however, the matter is considera-
bly more complicated. The older Uniform Partnership Act held that 
the departure of any partner dissolved the partnership.205 RUPA 
changed that doctrine, introducing the concept of “dissociation” to 
address those scenarios where one partner departs but the part-
nership business continues through the remaining partners.206 When 
a partner dissociates under RUPA, most often the partnership 
will continue, and the dissociating partner will leave with her share 
of the partnership assets, arranged effectively as a buyout.207 Un-
fortunately, for the lawyer working with startup founders, RUPA’s 
                                                                                                            
203 A change in ownership of a corporation does not affect the organization’s 
lawyer’s duty to the organizational client. See, e.g., Bryan Corp. v. Abrano, 52 
N.E.3d 95, 100–02 (Mass. 2016) (disqualifying a corporation’s lawyer after su-
ing corporation when new board took control); Goodrich v. Goodrich, 960 A.2d 
1275, 1285 (N.H. 2008) (holding that a corporation with new ownership gained 
attorney-client privilege with the law firm that represented corporation previ-
ously); Christopher C. Wang, Comment, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Allocating 
Fees from the Unfinished Business of a Professional Corporation, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1367, 1374 (1997). 
204 See Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 674–75 (Del. Ch. 2012) (hold-
ing LLC member did not have unilateral right to force a cessation of business). 
205 See UPA § 29 (CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. LAWS 1914). 
206 RUPA § 801(1) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
207 Id. § 701; see also Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, 
Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1391 (2006). 
 
2017] ETHICS OF REPRESENTING FOUNDERS 311 
dissociation option will not easily apply, as explained below,208 
which means that the partnership would often dissolve when a 
partner leaves the enterprise through drift or disagreement.209 
RUPA distinguishes between “at-will”210 and “term”211 partner-
ships. The partnership established by operation of law by the activity 
of a group of startup founders will inevitably be an at-will partner-
ship, as no separate agreement would have been established.212 The 
dissociation option does not apply to an at-will partnership except 
where the dissociated partner has been expelled by the other part-
ners for various identified reasons or in identified circumstances.213 
A partner simply leaving an at-will partnership does not trigger 
RUPA’s dissociation alternative, which means that the partner-
ship must dissolve, just as under the older UPA doctrine.214 Only 
if all of the parties agree, including the departing partner, may 
the original partnership continue.215 
Let us apply this to the AddicTrak example introduced above,216 
starting with the “drift” scenario and then comparing that to the 
disagreement scenario. 
1. Partner Drift 
As we saw when the founders were not yet a partnership, after 
the team has worked together for several weeks after the first 
meeting with counsel (and before any final action has occurred to 
create a formal entity), Netia gradually but noticeably stops par-
ticipating in the group’s planning and development. Efforts by the 
remaining team members to re-engage Netia do not succeed. The 
                                                                                                            
208 RUPA § 101 cmt. (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
209 Id. § 801(1). 
210 Id. § 101(8) (“‘Partnership at will’ means a partnership in which the part-
ners have not agreed to remain partners until the expiration of a definite term 
or the completion of a particular undertaking.”). 
211 Id. (explaining that RUPA does not expressly define term partnerships, 
but its definition of at-will partnerships identifies the concept by implication.). 
212 Id. § 101 cmt. (“Presumptively, every partnership is an at-will partnership.”). 
213 Id. § 801(1). 
214 Id. See Val Ricks, Self-Help in the Break-Up of Informal Partnerships, 12 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 259, 262–63 (2014). 
215 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 170; Ricks, supra note 214, at 265–66. 
216 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
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team finally agrees that it ought to replace Netia with a new team 
member, Rica. Sofia, the team’s lawyer, must now reassess her 
representational responsibilities. 
The partnership that Sofia represents is an at-will partnership, 
because it has no term.217 Netia’s having left the team may reason-
ably be seen as her withdrawal from the partnership,218 and not be-
cause of an expulsion under circumstances addressed by RUPA.219 
Her departure therefore dissolves the partnership, and Sofia now 
represents a dissolving, winding-up entity.220 The remaining part-
ners have two options, assuming, as is quite likely, that they want 
to continue their nascent and emerging business, albeit without 
Netia. One option is to obtain Netia’s express agreement to con-
tinue the partnership, an option permitted by RUPA.221 In the 
“drift” scenario, Netia likely has no objection to the remaining 
partners continuing with AddicTrak,222 but her silence seemingly 
                                                                                                            
217 See Bendalin v. Youngblood & Assocs., 381 S.W.3d 719, 740 (Tex. App. 
2012); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 167. 
218 Netia’s dissociation would be based on her partners’ “having notice of 
[Netia’s] express will to withdraw as a partner.” RUPA § 601(1) (NAT’L CONF. 
OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). That notice need not be in writing. See Robert W. 
Hillman, RUPA and Former Partners: Cutting the Gordian Knot with Continuing 
Partnership Entities, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 15–16 (1995) (analyzing this 
question under RUPA). According to RUPA, a person has notice of a fact when the 
person “knows of it; has received a notification of it; or has reason to know it exists 
from all of the facts known to the person at the time in question.” RUPA § 102(b) 
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). Partners may require that no-
tice be in writing in their partnership agreement if they choose. Id. § 103(b)(6). 
219 RUPA permits dissociation to occur rather than dissolution if the part-
ners expel the departing partner for reasons expressed in the partnership 
agreement or through a judicial order based on the departing partner’s “mate-
rial breach of ... a duty owed to the partnership.” Id. § 601(2)–(3), 601(5). Because 
the setting discussed in the text involves a default partnership with no written 
agreement, the former expulsion option does not apply. And the partners are 
very unlikely to seek a court order because of one of their group members 
drifted away, so the latter option is equally inapplicable. 
220 Id. § 803 (explaining that partners participate in winding-up process); 
see also Rutledge & Lu, supra note 191, at 770–71. 
221 RUPA § 802(b) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
222 In the informal, pre-entity startup setting, it is quite likely that Netia 
does not know that she is (or was) a partner or what the dissolution or dissoci-
ation implications are of her new lack of engagement. 
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is not sufficient.223 She needs to agree that the business will con-
tinue without her.224 An email from Netia should suffice.225 
A cautious lawyer might consider the option of communicating 
to Netia, after she has stopped participating in the enterprise, to 
confirm in writing the firm’s conclusion that Netia has left the 
first partnership voluntarily, that the remaining partners wish to 
continue to pursue the enterprise’s business model, and that the 
firm intends to remain as counsel to the partnership. Sofia might 
perceive such a letter or email as providing the necessary hind-
sight clarity should a dispute about the departure arise in the fu-
ture, after the business has become prominent or profitable. Whether 
such a writing serves the strategic purposes of the firm is a ques-
tion that will turn on the facts and circumstances of the enter-
prise and the firm’s relationship with Netia. For purposes of this 
discussion about the lawyer’s responsibilities, the ethics question 
is whether Sofia has any right to communicate with Netia without 
the permission of Janelle and Arjun. The answer to that question 
appears to be probably yes. 
Netia has never been a client of Sofia, but only a constituent 
of Sofia’s organizational client, the partnership. She is therefore 
not a former client.226 Model Rule 1.6(a) limits what Sofia may 
disclose to others outside of the organization.227 While Netia was 
a partner, Sofia could communicate with her about partnership 
matters without any consent of the other partners, as she did 
have a right under partnership law to information about the part-
nership business during her time as a partner.228 She is now no 
longer a partner. After Netia ceases to be a partner, the ordinary 
application of the confidentiality rule would conclude that Sofia 
may not communicate about the enterprise’s business affairs 
                                                                                                            
223 RUPA § 802(b) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
224 Id. 
225 All of the partners must waive the rights to have the partnership termi-
nated to avoid dissolution. Id. That provision does not require that the waiver 
be in writing. Id. Even if that is a fair reading of the law, it is common to accept 
email as sufficient written notice. See, e.g., Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes 
Benz USA, LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2014). 
226 See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text. 
227 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (2012) (Information may not 
be disclosed outside of the client relationship without client consent.). 
228 See RUPA § 403(b), (c) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
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without the informed consent of the management of the client.229 
But Sofia has no “client” except for the dissolving partnership, 
which, according to RUPA, “continues after dissolution only for 
the purpose of winding up its business.”230 And all partners, ex-
cept those who have wrongfully dissociated, “may participate in 
winding up the partnership’s business.”231 Therefore, Sofia may 
communicate with Netia about partnership affairs just as she 
does with Janelle and Arjun, at least to the extent that Netia 
needs to know partnership information or have access to the part-
nership’s books and records.232 
The second option, if Netia does not agree to the continuation 
of the partnership, is for Sofia to recognize the reconstituted 
group of founders as a new partnership, with Janelle, Arjun, and 
Rica as the partners.233 Nothing prevents Janelle and Arjun from 
starting a new partnership, of course,234 but that would be a new 
entity. The firm must acknowledge, though, that the dissolved 
partnership is now a former client, and the successor partnership 
is a new client, requiring a new retainer in writing.235 The critical 
point is that the dissolution of the partnership leaves the law firm 
without any client at all, until it establishes a relationship with 
one or more of the original partners.236 Presumably, in the “drift” 
scenario, Netia will neither be competing directly with her former 
team members, nor have any objection to a new partnership arising. 
But, of course, she may. To appreciate Netia’s rights as a former 
                                                                                                            
229 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a). 
230 RUPA § 802(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997); see also 
Arnold M. Wensinger, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Breakup Provisions: 
Stability or Headache?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 905, 928 (1993). 
231 RUPA § 803(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
232 It is true that partnerships by default operate by majority rule. Id. 
§ 401(j). However, a majority of partners may not vote to deny a minority part-
ner access to information or the partnership’s books. Id. § 103(b)(2) (partners 
may not “unreasonably restrict the right of access to books and records under 
Section 403(b)”); Landeo & Spier, supra note 200, at 154. 
233 See Clay B. Wortham, Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Anomalies of a 
Simplified, Modernized Partnership Law, 92 KY. L.J. 1083, 1089–90 (2004). 
234 See id. 
235 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (2002); supra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
236 RUPA permits the dissolving partnership to continue to operate during 
the winding-up period. See RUPA § 803 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. 
L. 1997). But, no entity exists after the dissolution has been effected. Id. 
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partner while the other founders establish a new partnership, let 
us turn to the question of partner fluidity through disagreement, 
for which the potential conflicts between Netia and her other 
partners are more apparent. 
2. Partner Disagreement 
Imagine, similar to the above discussion in which the partici-
pants were individual joint clients,237 that after the law firm has 
accepted the representation of the partnership of Janelle, Arjun, 
and Netia, the team encounters serious internal conflict about how 
the enterprise will proceed, with Janelle and Arjun disagreeing with 
the strategic visions of Netia. The efforts of Sofia, the partnership’s 
counsel, to mediate the differences among the partners do not suc-
ceed. Whereas in the joint representation context that disagreement 
required the withdrawal of the law firm from continued represen-
tation, in the partnership setting Sofia may proceed while taking 
direction from the majority of partners.238 But let us assume now 
that Netia announces that she will leave the partnership. 
The same analysis applies as described above when Netia drifted 
away, in that the partnership cannot remain in place without Netia’s 
express permission,239 which in the conflict setting is even less 
likely. Therefore, the option for Janelle and Arjun, with Rica now 
joining the team, is to form a new partnership, which Sofia would 
presumptively represent. Similarly, nothing prevents Netia from 
starting a new business in any fashion, including with Rashad as 
a partner, forming a new partnership.240 Those two partnerships 
(Janelle, Arjun, and Rica; Netia and Rashad) could compete di-
rectly, as long as the competition was “fair, meaning in large part 
that it does not involve use of confidential information and trade 
secrets.”241 The duty of loyalty that all partners possessed during the 
                                                                                                            
237 See supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
238 RUPA § 401(j). Recall that the startup story here assumes no written 
partnership agreement that would alter the common or statutory law govern-
ing partnership management. 
239 Id. 
240 J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND 
THE LLC IN A NUTSHELL 251 (3d ed. 2005). 
241 Id. 
 
316 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:267 
life of the partnership does not prevent direct competition after the 
partnership has dissolved.242 RUPA states that “a partner is free 
to compete immediately upon an event of dissolution ... unless the 
partnership agreement otherwise provides.”243 Because the part-
nerships considered here are formed by default, no such partnership 
agreement will interfere with the right to compete immediately, as 
long as the secrets of each partner are respected.244 
That analytic reading of the legal ethics and partnership doc-
trines triggers some rather complicated practical implications for 
Sofia and her law firm, given the fluid nature of the work occur-
ring both within the business and in the law firm. If Netia chooses 
to leave and provides clear notice in advance of her intention to 
dissociate from the partnership,245 then the firm will respond by 
preparing to lose its client (the partnership) on the date of the 
dissociation, subject to any wind-up, and can choose whom it will 
seek to represent after that date.246 But that carefully planned 
dissociation is not likely to occur during the beginning stages of a 
startup operation, where friends and colleagues work together to 
see if a business idea has legs. Netia may respond to her disagree-
ments with Janelle and Arjun by employing passive-aggressive 
tactics, participating less in the business, and telling another 
member of the team that she no longer wishes to be part of the 
enterprise. Determining exactly when the original client has lost 
                                                                                                            
242 Id. 
243 RUPA §§ 404 cmt. 2, 603(b)(2). 
244 How one determines what information that Netia brought to the original 
partnership would qualify as a trade secret or confidential information is beyond 
the scope of this Article. For a discussion of that topic, see Robert W. Hillman, 
Law Firm Risk Management in an Era of Breakups and Lawyer Mobility: Lim-
itations and Opportunities, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 449, 459–60 (2011); see also 
Luppino, supra note 173, at 374. Understanding the scope of any such trade 
secrets or confidential information would be critical for the law firm if it intends 
to continue to work with one of the resulting new partnerships, as its repre-
sentational duties will be limited by the constraints of those secrets. 
245 Not surprisingly, RUPA’s protocols contemplate a partner’s explicit and 
overt dissociation, as its teachings tend to apply to active businesses with as-
sets, property, debt, and so on. With startups composed of participants who 
may not know that they are partners, the leaving may be less formal and ex-
plicit. See RUPA § 801. 
246 Id. § 801(1). 
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its identity will not be easy for the firm, and avoiding giving advice 
to the successor partnership will be almost impossible.247 
The firm could anticipate this eventuality in its original re-
tainer agreement, perhaps. That agreement would identify the 
client as the partnership, and the three founders as general part-
ners, unless and until a different entity has been established. Absent 
a written partnership agreement (which may never materialize if 
the founders agree rather soon to establish a different entity such 
as an LLC), the partners will decide matters with equal authority 
and own the business equally. The retainer may proceed to state 
that if any partner chooses to leave the enterprise, that departure 
will most likely dissolve the partnership, and the firm may nego-
tiate any future retainer with the remaining partners or with the 
partner who has left. The retainer agreement could then include 
a warning to the partners that the firm will use its best efforts to 
determine when an automatic dissolution has occurred, and will 
seek to avoid offering advice, other than wind-up advice,248 to the 
partners after any such dissolution has occurred, until the partic-
ipants understand whom the firm will represent going forward. 
The engagement letter or retainer agreement could also include 
notice that any advice provided by the firm to any partners after 
dissolution without knowledge of the dissolution may not be used 
by any former partner of the former client to limit the firm’s 
choices of representation in the future.249 It is not entirely clear 
                                                                                                            
247 Under more conventional circumstances, winding-up the partnership 
“entails selling its assets, paying its debts, and distributing the net balance, if 
any, to the partners in cash according to their interests.” Id. § 801 cmt. 2. 
248 For a discussion of the role of the partnership lawyer in the wind-up pro-
cess, see Mark J. Fucile, Keeping Company: Representing Start-Up Business in 
Good Times and Bad, OR. ST. B. (Apr. 2002), https://www.osbar.org/publica 
tions/bulletin/02apr/company.htm [https://perma.cc/LPB4-Y5WZ] (discussing 
potential attorney conflicts in dissolution); 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 440, Westlaw 
(database updated September 2016) (noting that a partnership continues through 
dissolution as to third parties). 
249 It is important to understand that the law firm may not learn that Netia 
has left the partnership until several weeks after that development has oc-
curred. The partnership may have dissolved by the default operation of RUPA 
without the lawyers having advised about either the dissolution or the default 
formation of a new partnership among the remaining founders. The intent of the 
language suggested in the text would be to preclude Netia from claiming that 
the law firm provided advice to her after she was no longer a constituent of the 
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that such self-protective language would have much relevant sub-
stance,250 but it does not appear that including that warning, should 
the firm so choose, violates any ethical duty or common law doctrine 
prospectively limiting a law firm’s liability for malpractice.251 
Whether the firm would choose to include in its retainer agree-
ment such a direct treatment of future partner departures is a 
judgment call for the firm weighing the risks of not covering the 
topic and the worries generated by raising the matter so early in 
the relationship.252 
Law firms representing true ground-level startups, and espe-
cially pro bono firms working with those businesses with the few-
est assets and the least developed business plans, might find that 
“the drift” described here happens with some regularity within 
the loosely organized groups of entrepreneurs who come to the 
lawyers with their embryonic new business ideas.253 If drift is a 
                                                                                                            
client and, therefore, that she qualified as a former client under Rule 1.9. See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (2002); Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 
830, 838 (D.C. 1994) (finding the partnership lawyer had developed an attorney-
client relationship with one of the partners). 
250 The language in the text resembles a form of advance waiver to a former-
client conflict of interest, which under many circumstances is enforceable. For 
a discussion of advance waivers, see generally Michael J. DiLernia, Advance Waiv-
ers of Conflicts of Interest in Large Law Firm Practice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
97 (2009); Elena Postnikova, Note, Conflict Waivers that Do Not Cure Conflicts 
Apparent Inconsistency in the Jurisprudence Governing Advance Waivers and How 
These Waivers Can Become More Effective, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839 (2015). 
251 The Model Rules substantially restrict a lawyer’s authority to negotiate an 
advance waiver of malpractice. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(h)(1) 
(clarifying that waiver is only effective if the client has independent represen-
tation, and not just the opportunity to seek such counsel). The language in the 
text does not ask for a prospective limitation on malpractice liability, but only 
clarifies the lawyer’s role during an otherwise ambiguous period of time. 
252 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of 
Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 IOWA L. REV. 965, 974–77 (1997) (analyzing the 
costs and benefits to attorneys and clients based on a decision to contractually 
allow or prohibit conflict of interest representation). 
253 The growing availability of incubators and accelerators within the tech-
nology startup world, along with the increasing availability of free legal ser-
vices to the participants in those programs, increases the likelihood that law 
firms will encounter the partnership by default and drift phenomena. See gen-
erally Ian Hathaway, Accelerating Growth: Startup Accelerator Programs in 
the United States, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.brookings.edu 
/research/papers/2016/02/17-startup-accelerator-programs-hathaway [https:// 
perma.cc/4GS8-X8AR] (noting accelerator pool increased from sixteen programs 
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common occurrence, firms must have an intentional appreciation 
for the role of the firm when the partners come and go. 
The foregoing considerations seem to suggest a conclusion that, 
from an ethical standpoint, the law firm may proceed in a fashion 
that is less complicated and more fluid than when the founders 
appear without partnership status. But before we accept that con-
clusion, we must explore one further consideration that, at a min-
imum, muddies the analytical waters and, at worst, undercuts the 
entity advantages just described. That consideration is the nature 
of the partners’ fiduciary duties to one another in the operation of 
the partnership business. 
3. The Fiduciary Responsibilities of the Partners and the Law 
Firm to the Other Partners 
Partners owe one another some fiduciary duties.254 The litera-
ture about partnership fiduciary duties is vast, with contractari-
ans defending the right of partners to choose autonomously as few 
duties as possible,255 and fiduciarians asserting that less sophis-
ticated founders need strong protections established by law.256 
Different jurisdictions articulate differing strengths of the required 
                                                                                                            
in 2008 to 170 programs in 2014); Greg Bullock, Want to Raise Growth-Stage 
Capital? Join an Incubator or Accelerator, Studies Suggest, CENT. FOR ENTRE-
PRENEURIAL INNOVATION (Mar. 17, 2016, 2:26 PM), http://blog.ceigateway.com 
/blog/want-to-raise-growth-stage-capital-join-an-incubator-or-accelerator-studies 
-suggest [https://perma.cc/DL9A-T3G9]. 
254 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 145–46; see also Keatinge, supra 
note 6, at 403–08; Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty, 
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 878–82 (1997). 
255 For a sampling of this literature, see, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Fiduciary 
Duty, Contract, and Waiver in Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 
1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 55, 57 (1997); J. William Callison, Blind Men 
and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 109, 112 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 209, 251 (2005) (arguing that the mere status of partners does not 
subject them to fiduciary duties). 
256 See Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 523–24 (1993); Donald 
J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership 
Act, 46 BUS. LAW. 427, 435 (1991). 
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duties within common law partnerships.257 For present purposes, 
however, considering partnerships by default with no written 
agreements, it is clear that the founders owe each other at mini-
mum a duty of loyalty258 and a duty of care.259 The duty of loyalty 
states that a partner may not engage in partnership business for 
personal gain,260 compete with the partnership without the other 
partners’ consent,261 or support others who would compete with 
the partnership’s business.262 A partner must also account to the 
remaining partners for benefits received through the partnership 
business.263 The duty of care simply requires that a partner make 
business decisions for the partnership with the care an ordinarily 
prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances.264 A law-
yer representing the partnership who is aware that a partner is 
engaged in a breach of a fiduciary duty and actively assists in that 
breach could possibly be liable in tort to the wronged partner(s), 
notwithstanding the absence of an attorney-client relationship 
between the lawyer and the individual partners.265 
Therefore, while representing the founders’ partnership by de-
fault during the period when partners might come and go, the 
lawyer must be attentive to the treatment of the less influential 
partners by the more powerful.266 Unlike with close corporations, 
                                                                                                            
257 HYNES & LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 240, at 244 (explaining that duties 
owed among partners, while fiduciary in nature, are less strict than those of 
trustees or guardians, who act as true fiduciaries). Compare Cardullo v. Landau, 
105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952) (discussing “utmost good faith and loyalty”), 
with Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 5 N.E.3d 923, 933–34 (Mass. 2014) (apply-
ing the same standards to close corporations); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 
328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975). 
258 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 135–44. 
259 Id. at 145–46. 
260 RUPA § 404(b)(1) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
261 Id. § 404(b)(3). 
262 Id. § 404(b)(2). 
263 Id. § 404(b)(1). 
264 See id. § 404(c). 
265 Fischer, supra note 5, at 965 n.20; see also Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let’s 
Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims Against Lawyers for Aiding and Abetting 
a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 140 (2008); Rutledge, 
supra note 5, at 372; Eugene J. Schiltz, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting: 
Should Lawyers Be “Privileged” to Assist Their Clients’ Wrongdoing?, 29 PACE 
L. REV. 75, 81 (2008). 
266 See Molitor, supra note 84, at 567. 
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majority-interest partners typically cannot squeeze out267 or freeze 
out268 partners with minority shares in the business, because the 
power of the minority owners to dissolve the partnership provides 
an exit opportunity not available to close corporation sharehold-
ers.269 But partnerships can and do exhibit behaviors where some 
partners treat others wrongfully or oppressively.270 Law firms 
that assist unfaithful partners risk liability to the injured part-
ners.271 While the ABA’s Committee on Professional Ethics (the 
“Committee”) concludes that a law firm representing a partnership 
                                                                                                            
267 In a typical squeeze-out transaction, controlling shareholders and/or 
managers extract benefits from the corporation and minimize the gains of mi-
nority shareholders while they remain members of the business organization. 
See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS: PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN SQUEEZE-OUTS AND OTHER 
INTRACORPORATE CONFLICTS § 1.01 (2d ed. 2003); Marco Ventoruzzo, Freeze-Outs: 
Transcontinental Analysis and Reform Proposals, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 841, 842 
(2010); Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C., 
541 N.E.2d 997, 998 (Mass. 1989) (finding that the law firm “helped Gross in 
his attempts to ‘squeeze out’ the plaintiff from Paragon”). 
268 While the terms are often used interchangeably, a freeze out differs from 
a squeeze out in that, in the former setting, “majority shareholders force mi-
nority shareholders to sell their shares either through a statutory provision or 
simply by creating de facto—and sometimes abusive—incentives to sell the 
shares.” Ventoruzzo, supra note 267, at 842; see also Brent J. Horton, The Going-
Private Freeze-Out: A Unique Danger for Investors in Delaware Non-Corporate 
Business Associations, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 53, 83–89 (2013); Arford v. Blalock, 
405 S.E.2d 698, 702 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (“A partner may not … ‘freeze out’ a co-
partner and appropriate the business to his own use.”). 
269 Paul T. Geske, Note, Oppress Me No More: Amending the Illinois LLC Act 
to Provide Additional Remedies for Oppressed Minority Members, 90 CHI-KENT 
L. REV. 185, 200 (2015); but see Franklin A. Gevurtz, Preventing Partnership 
Freeze-Outs, 40 MERCER L. REV. 535, 541–42 (1989) (claiming that partnerships 
do experience freeze-out scenarios). 
270 See Gevurtz, supra note 269, at 541–42; see also Susan J. Swinson, Part-
ner v. Partner, Actions at Law for Wrongdoing in a Partnership, 9 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 905, 917–19 (1993). 
271 See 3 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 26:38 (2016 ed.); see also 
Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (examining a 
claim stated against lawyer for aiding in a partner’s breach of fiduciary duty); 
Kenny v. Murphy, No. 08-P-996, 2010 WL 46376, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) 
(demonstrating claim against attorney for aiding in a joint venturer’s breach of his 
fiduciary duty); cf. Christine L. Eid, Comment, Lawyer Liability for Aiding and 
Abetting Squeeze-Outs, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1177, 1195–96 (2008) (dis-
cussing a similar theory of liability in the LLC context); Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 146–61. 
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does not owe any representational duties to the individual part-
ners272—a conclusion with which not all authorities concur273—the 
Committee acknowledges that a lawyer may be liable in some set-
tings for assisting one or more partners in a breach of their fiduciary 
duties to the other partners.274 
Partners with fiduciary duties to one another may manage the 
partnership through majority decision-making without any breach of 
duty, as long as the duties of loyalty and care are not contravened.275 
That result follows from a straightforward reading of RUPA.276 
Therefore, Sofia in our example above may act for her entity client 
when she has the consent of a majority of the three founders. 
The more complicated question for Sofia is how the fiduciary 
obligations affect her relationship with the departing partner, af-
ter drift or after conflict. The conclusion drawn above was that, 
because the departing partner was not a client, the firm could 
continue its representation of the remaining partners in a new 
partnership replacing the entity, which was dissolved automati-
cally by the departure of one of its members.277 Given the context 
                                                                                                            
272 ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 361 (1991). 
273 Commentators observe that in some contexts, despite the entity concep-
tion of a partnership under both RUPA and the ABA ethics opinion, courts find 
that a lawyer representing a partnership owes attorney-client duties to each 
partner. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 964; Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a Current 
Client, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1157, 1191 (1996); Simon, supra note 5, at 110; 
Frederic L. Smith, Jr., Comment, Partnership Representation: Finding the Client, 
20 J. LEGAL PROF. 355 (1996). 
274 In small partnerships, the ABA opinion observes, “the likelihood that the 
attorney representing the entity will be held to stand in a confidential, or fidu-
ciary, relationship with the individual shareholders, or partners, is much greater.” 
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 361 (1991) (citing 
Fassihi v. Sommers, 309 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)). 
275 RUPA § 401(j) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
276 Given that RUPA authorizes partnerships to proceed through majority 
voting of the partners and given that a partnership of more than two partners 
could not function if all management decisions required full consensus, it is a 
well-accepted conclusion that outvoting one’s fellow partners does not amount 
to a breach of a duty to those partners. See id. No common law authority exists 
to the contrary. Cf. J & J Celcom v. AT&T Wireless Servs. Inc., 169 P.3d 823 
(Wash. 2007) (en banc) (holding that the majority partner was not liable to minority 
partners for purchase of another partner’s assets, as the majority partner acted 
in good faith, paid fair consideration, and disclosed material information). 
277 See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text. 
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examined here, when the business is operating as a partnership 
by default at the initial startup phase, with little if any invest-
ment and little value to the company yet, the chances that one of 
the partners leaves bgecause she has been frozen or squeezed out 
is unlikely.278 Obviously, if Sofia learns that Janelle and Arjun 
have been actively scheming to isolate and nudge Netia out of the 
ongoing operations, the firm ought to ensure that it does not assist 
the two in harming the interests of the third.279 But that is not really 
the likely worry for the firm in the early stage startup context. 
The more common worry for the firm comes after Netia leaves, 
for either of the two reasons considered above. Because the law 
firm had no attorney-client relationship with Netia individually, 
she is not to be treated as a former client, but is instead a former 
constituent, and the movement of constituents from an organiza-
tion does not affect the ongoing attorney-client relationship or the 
law firm’s commitments to its entity client.280 The firm has no ob-
ligation to maintain confidentiality with regard to any information it 
learned from Netia, except as the business requires through its 
duly authorized constituents.281 But because the partners owed a 
fiduciary relationship to Netia as a partner, the question for the firm 
is whether the remaining partners owe any continuing duties to 
                                                                                                            
278 See, e.g., Shareholder Squeeze Outs and Partnership Freeze Outs, 
HOROWITZ L. OFFS., http://www.hwchicagolaw.com/practice-areas/corporatelaw 
/shareholder-squeeze-outs-and-partnership-freeze-outs/ [https://perma.cc /9VEW 
-XYVQ]. 
279 See Eid, supra note 271, at 1188. Not all authorities agree that assisting, 
especially through the provision of conventional legal services, with activity 
known to breach a partner’s fiduciary duty will lead to the law firm’s liability. 
Some courts have been protective of the attorney-client relationship and dis-
courage claims by non-clients, as the resulting duties create conflicts for the 
attorney. See id. at 1222; see also Pierce, supra note 36, at 354. A lawyer may 
assist in breach of fiduciary duty unless the client’s conduct equates to crime 
or fraud. See Pierce, supra note 36, at 354. 
280 See Bryan Corp. v. Abrano, 52 N.E.3d 95, 102, 104 (Mass. 2016) (finding 
that a corporation’s lawyer owed a duty to the corporation even after new board 
took control). 
281 Information counsel learns by representing an organization is protected 
by Rule 1.6’s confidentiality duties, but only so far as the organization chooses. 
The law firm owes no confidentiality duties to the constituent other than those 
chosen by the client, acting through its duly authorized constituents. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 131 (2000); N.J. Eth. 
Op. 664 (1992); R.I. Ethics Op. 04 (2003). 
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her, duties that the law firm must seek to respect or, at minimum, 
to avoid assisting in their breach. 
The law firm’s responsibilities will depend on its assessment 
of who owns the property with value within the partnership’s en-
terprise, including the intellectual property (IP), and how the part-
ners address the property when the drifting partner leaves. Netia 
(whether she is aware of it or not) is entitled to an accounting and 
a return on her investment as the partnership dissolves.282 Her 
“investment” could include her contribution of some of the part-
nership’s beginning IP ideas.283 The IP would most likely belong 
to the partnership, and would need to be transferred to some other 
party upon dissolution, perhaps to the remaining partners with 
their new partnership, with compensation paid to Netia.284 The 
fiduciary duties possessed by Janelle and Arjun toward Netia pre-
sumably include the commitment to honor Netia’s redemption rights. 
Any efforts by the continuing partners (within the newly estab-
lished partnership) to deprive Netia of her entitlements would raise 
questions for Sofia about the propriety of her remaining as counsel 
for the new enterprise after Netia drifted away.285 
                                                                                                            
282 See RUPA § 701 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
283 Mann et al., supra note 3, at 775 (“A business begins with an idea.”). 
284 HURT ET AL., supra note 30, § 7.12(a); Moore v. Rawson, 85 N.E. 586, 586, 
589–90 (Mass. 1908) (holding three continuing partners who used company 
name after dissolution accountable to fourth partner for good will of the firm 
in the same manner as if it had been sold in dissolution proceedings). The IP 
ownership question within a partnership is far too complex to address with any 
satisfactory detail here. If the company name or logo has been registered with 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, it will be the property of the 
partnership. See Pamela S. Chestek, Who Owns the Open Source Project Name?, 
103 TRADEMARK REP. 1240, 1252 (2013). With partnerships by default addressed 
in this Article, such a registration in the name of the partnership is unlikely. 
A successful registration of a patent in the company name is even more un-
likely. The partnership more often will possess copyright interests, which arise 
more easily in the absence of registration. See Ale & McKinney, supra note 8, 
at 478–79. 
285 As noted above, if Netia were to agree, while drifting away from the en-
terprise, that Janelle and Arjun may continue with the business, then the part-
nership will not dissolve and Sofia will not have a new client entity. See RUPA 
§ 802(b); see also HURT ET AL., supra note 30, § 14.11(c); Lange v. Bartlett, 360 
N.W.2d 702, 704 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). Her agreement does not eliminate the 
partnership’s duty to provide to Netia her buy-out entitlements. See Hillman 
& Weidner, supra note 8, at 471. 
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It is a good thing for Sofia to worry about how the remaining 
partners intend to deal with Netia’s entitlements, but disagree-
ment about that topic does not necessarily mean that Sofia may 
not serve as counsel to the new partnership of Janelle, Arjun, and 
Rica.286 As long as she does not actively assist the new partnership 
or the partners in an effort to deprive Netia of her post-dissolution 
entitlements, Sofia could provide legal services to the partnership 
on all of its other partnership business287 (which likely would in-
clude the establishment of a formal entity which will later become 
the client of Sofia and her law firm).288 
In the “drift” scenario involving the startup’s partnership by 
default, the question of Netia’s entitlements after the winding-up 
of the original partnership is probably not going to arise, as the 
new partnership, with Rica replacing Netia, will likely simply pro-
ceed in a rather seamless fashion.289 When Netia leaves because 
of a disagreement about strategy or similar conflict, the question 
of her entitlements is more likely to arise.290 The posture for Sofia 
and her law firm remains the same as in the drift scenario. As coun-
sel to the dissolving partnership, Sofia must advise the partners 
about the dissolution process and the liquidation or transfer of the 
partnership assets.291 If Netia actively competes with the busi-
ness that would not share or adopt her strategic visions, as may 
be likely, that reality is not a significant worry for Sofia’s contin-
uing as counsel for the new partnership, at least under RUPA and 
the fiduciary duties it generates.292 Former partners may compete 
with one another after the dissociation from the partnership as 
                                                                                                            
286 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmts. 34–35 (2002). 
287 Sofia’s only reason for not remaining as counsel to the successor partner-
ship (aside from her or the new partners’ preferences) would be to avoid assist-
ing in a breach of the duties owed to Netia. Because Netia was never Sofia’s client, 
the ordinary successive conflicts rules involving former clients do not apply. 
See Responsible Citizens v. Super. Ct. of Fresno, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 766 (1993). 
288 See Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 187–88; see also Pierce, supra note 36, at 
332–33. 
289 But Sofia ought to be crystal clear that she now has a new client, with a 
new engagement letter prepared to establish the new relationship. See supra 
note 19 and accompanying text. 
290 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The New Law of Freeze-Out Mergers, 49 MO. 
L. REV. 517, 562 (1984). 
291 See RUPA § 801 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
292 See id. § 404 cmt. 2. 
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long as no partner is relying on the partnership’s trade secrets or 
similar confidential information in the successor business.293 
Here, then, is Sofia’s role after Netia has left, whether as a 
result of drift or disagreement. The remaining partners who will 
continue with the business plan will presumably not wish to lose 
the company’s counsel because of Netia’s departure, and Sofia 
most likely would prefer to continue representation. With Netia’s 
express agreement, the partnership may survive, with Sofia’s as-
sistance no doubt, after the partners address Netia’s buy-out rights 
as a dissociated partner.294 If the partners happen to renege on 
satisfying Netia’s entitlements even after she agrees to a contin-
uation of the partnership, Sofia need not withdraw as counsel for 
the continuing partnership so long as she does not assist the part-
ners in what she now sees as a breach of the remaining partners’ 
fiduciary duties to Netia.295 If she cannot continue to work with 
Janelle and Arjun (and now Rica) without assisting in that breach, 
then she most likely must withdraw.296 
If Netia does not agree to a continuation of the partnership, 
the partnership dissolves, and Janelle and Arjun (with Rica now) 
will form a new partnership to continue the business enterprise.297 
Sofia may accept representation of the new partnership without 
encountering any conflict of interest with Netia, even if Netia 
                                                                                                            
293 Id. (allowing for competition “immediately upon an event of dissolution”). 
294 See Lange v. Bartlett, 360 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). 
295 See Pierce, supra note 36, at 354. 
296 It is not entirely clear that Sofia must withdraw, but prudence dictates 
that she should, and will, withdraw. Model Rule 1.16(a) requires that an attor-
ney withdraw from representation of a client if continuing the representation 
“will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.” MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a) (2002). Rule 1.2(d) declares that Sofia may 
not “assist a client … in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.” 
Id. r. 1.2(d). It is not a crime or a fraud to aid in a breach of fiduciary duty, and 
some commentators have concluded, therefore, that the Model Rules do not 
prohibit a lawyer from that activity. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 5, at 986–87. 
But, as discussed earlier, Sofia may be liable in tort for assisting in the partners’ 
breach of their fiduciary duties to Netia. See supra note 265 and accompanying 
text. Sofia thus has “other good cause” to justify permissive withdrawal under 
Rule 1.16, even if the mandatory withdrawal rule does not apply, and she will 
rely on that permission to end her representation in order to protect against 
tort liability. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 (b)(7). 
297 See RUPA § 603 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
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starts her own competing business.298 But, just as above, Sofia 
may not assist Janelle and Arjun in any breach of their duties as 
members of a dissolving partnership to treat Netia fairly during 
the dissolution and winding-up process.299 The fact of such a 
breach does not preclude Sofia’s work with the new partnership 
so long as she does not assist in or facilitate the breach.300 
IV. REPRESENTING FOUNDERS OF NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES 
This Part addresses the ethical issues arising when a law firm 
agrees to represent the founders of an organization intended to 
serve as a charitable, tax-exempt organization but before the cre-
ation of an entity.301 The “tax-exempt” nature may not necessarily 
matter for this purpose, but the “charitable” nature is of substan-
tial concern. Because no individual may own any interest in a 
charitable—called here for convenience a “nonprofit”—organiza-
tion,302 the collection of founders will never morph into a partner-
ship entity, regardless of how active the enterprise has been.303 
Precisely because the organization has no owners, its mission and 
decision-making protocols cannot be driven by the preferences of 
those who own the largest interest in the enterprise.304 Some 
other device or protocol must be identified through which the law 
firm will take direction from the group’s constituents. 
                                                                                                            
298 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmts. 34–35. 
299 See RUPA  § 603 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’NS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). 
300 Id. 
301 Some, but not all, of the ethical issues arising in this setting have been 
explored in a prior article. See generally Tremblay, supra note 15 (exploring in 
some detail how a lawyer might understand when a loosely structured commu-
nity group may qualify as an “entity” for purposes of having one client rather 
than an aggregate of clients). 
302 Every state authorizes the establishment of charitable organizations, typi-
cally corporations, which are not owned by any person or persons. See ALVAREZ 
& TREMBLAY, supra note 101; LESTER M. SALAMON ET AL., AMERICA’S NONPROFIT 
SECTOR: A PRIMER 21–25 (3d ed. 2012). 
303 See RUPA § 202(a)–(c), cmts. 1–3 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. 
L. 1997) (stating individuals must share profits in order for their dealings to 
amount to a partnership). 
304 See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2008) (noting each member of 
the nonprofit’s board has a fiduciary duty to act “in a manner the director rea-
sonably believes to be in the best interest of the nonprofit corporation” as opposed 
to the interests of the members).  
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Many of the same issues discussed above will be relevant to a 
lawyer’s work with nonprofits, but the following questions apply 
especially to the lawyer’s work with founders of a nonprofit enter-
prise: (1) How ought the lawyer proceed in those settings where the 
founders do not know whether their proposed enterprise ought to 
proceed as a nonprofit or as a for-profit business?; (2) For those 
enterprises whose founders intend to operate as nonprofits, who 
serves as the lawyer’s client (or clients)?; (3) Does the charitable 
nature of a nonprofit’s mission alter the lawyer’s counseling re-
sponsibilities and, if so, how? This Part addresses each of these 
questions in order. 
A. Discerning the Charitable Nature of the Enterprise 
Let us imagine new entrepreneurs for this Part of the Article. 
Imagine that Gilad approaches Hank, a lawyer who is a member 
of a small law firm, for legal assistance with a project Gilad has 
been developing. Gilad has been working with Lynnel and Toni 
on a program to provide conflict-resolution skills and protocols for 
use in middle and high schools in urban neighborhoods where bul-
lying and violence have been prevalent. The program includes 
technology-based systems, training and classroom education, and 
direct mediation services. Gilad has a number of questions about 
licensing requirements, intellectual property, and choice of entity. 
The latter topic includes questions about whether the new enterprise 
might be established as a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization, and 
the advantages and disadvantages of doing so. The tentative 
name of the project is Resolution & Restoration (R&R). 
It is apparent to Hank that the R&R project could easily pro-
ceed as a for-profit business if the founders so wished. But, it is 
equally apparent that R&R, if designed correctly, could qualify as 
a Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization.305 Hank also sees a 
                                                                                                            
305 For the sake of the discussion in the text, assume that Hank is correct. 
The IRS has determined that some mediation services qualify as section 
501(c)(3) organizations. See Rev. Rul. 80-279, 19802-2 C.B. 176, 177 (stating 
low-cost mediation services qualify under section 501(c)(3)). See also Nonprofit 
Organizations, MEDIATE.COM, http://www.mediate.com/organizations [https:// 
perma.cc/3WME-45J7] (listing 27 national, state, and local mediation services 
claiming to be nonprofit). R&R also has the quality of being educational and 
serving underprivileged communities, which helps its eligibility for tax exemp-
tion. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2014) (“The term charitable ... includes: 
[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged[.]”). 
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possibility of operating R&R with two affiliated organizations, one 
a for-profit and the other a nonprofit.306 Gilad, Lynnel, and Toni, 
therefore, will benefit from Hank’s careful counseling about the 
choice they have in the business’s orientation and structure. 
Hank’s counseling of the three founders will, of course, precede 
the establishment of any entity, and for some significant period of 
time perhaps, as decisions about the choice of entity are difficult 
and critical. Because of the uncertainty of the nature of the result-
ing enterprise, Hank will need to proceed as though Gilad, Lynnel, 
and Toni will operate as owners of a for-profit business.307 Since 
the business is still at the idea stage, the attributes needed for a 
partnership by default are missing,308 so Hank will need to repre-
sent each of the entrepreneurs (if they remain as a group sharing 
one lawyer) individually and jointly. All of the considerations dis-
cussed earlier about that joint representation of a for-profit, in-
choate venture will apply to Hank’s work with this group.309 
B. Representation of an Emerging Charitable Enterprise 
1. Determining the Client Identity 
Often, the founders of a new social enterprise have a clearer 
vision that the project will be a nonprofit organization, if it ends 
up as a reality at all.310 Imagine, therefore, that Gilad, Lynnel, 
and Toni approach Hank’s law firm for assistance in establishing 
a food pantry in a local neighborhood in need of such a service. 
                                                                                                            
306 Organizations have developed mechanisms to operate a nonprofit, tax-
exempt business with a for-profit affiliate. For a description of that strategy, 
see Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 
572–74, 632 (1990); J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with 
Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-
Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2011) (dis-
cussing Mozilla Foundation’s maintenance of affiliated for-profit and nonprofit 
organizations); Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 34 (2011). 
307 See supra Part II.A. 
308 See supra notes 29–41 and accompanying text. 
309 See supra Part II.A and accompanying text. 
310 See generally James Austin, Howard Stevenson & Jane Wei-Skillern, Social 
and Commercial Entrepreneurship: Same, Different, or Both?, 30 ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP THEORY AND PRAC. 1 (2006). 
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Imagine further that these founders have been meeting with a 
group of concerned activist residents to map out the project. This 
group has decided to call itself Neighbors Concerned for Nutrition, 
or NCN. The founders seek to retain Hank’s law firm to establish 
a charitable organization and apply for Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
status with the IRS.311 Hank is prepared to accept the represen-
tation, and turns to crafting a letter of engagement or retainer 
agreement for the new client. 
Or, perhaps, the new clients. In this thin story, who ought to 
serve as the law firm’s client? It appears that three choices exist: 
(1) The three individuals as joint clients, like the “inchoate” en-
trepreneurs above; (2) all of the members of the neighborhood group 
as aggregate joint clients; or, finally, (3) the group NCN as one cli-
ent, as an entity. That array presents two levels of questions for 
Hank: First, is the choice among them one for the firm to make as 
it so desires, or does some substantive law require a specific ar-
rangement under these circumstances? Second, regardless of the 
answer to that question, what does the resulting commitment look 
like for Hank and his law firm? This subsection addresses the first 
question; the following subsection will explore the second. 
Hank must determine at the outset whether he will treat NCN 
as an entity client or treat the three founders as individual clients. 
His investigation of the relevant substantive law will leave him 
without a clear answer, but the more prudent read of the ambig-
uous authority will most often favor individual representation. 
If Hank were to treat NCN as his client, it would be as an infor-
mal unincorporated association, since NCN has no other status.312 
The substantive law’s guidance might differ depending upon 
whether Hank’s jurisdiction has adopted the Uniform Unincorpo-
rated Nonprofit Association Act (UUNAA),313 which provides other-
wise informal associations with rights, duties, and protections, or its 
successor Revised Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association 
                                                                                                            
311 See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012) (detailing the requirements of federal tax-exempt 
status). 
312 See REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(8) (NAT’L 
CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2008) [hereinafter RUUNAA]; UNIF. UNINCOR-
PORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(11) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. 
L. 1996) [hereinafter UUNAA]. 
313 See UUNAA § 3 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1996). 
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Act (RUUNAA).314 Most states have adopted neither,315 so let us 
first proceed on the assumption that no such statutory guidance 
exists for Hank. 
The prevailing authority holds that “[e]ach individual member 
of an unincorporated association is a client of the association’s 
lawyer.”316 With the possible exception of labor unions,317 no au-
thority has stated that the lawyer representing an unincorpo-
rated group does not also represent the members of the group.318 
However, a 1992 American Bar Association ethics opinion con-
strues Model Rule 1.13, addressing a lawyer’s responsibilities to 
                                                                                                            
314 See RUUNAA §§ 3–5 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2008). For 
examples of state statutes implementing the Model Act or its 1996 predecessor, 
see ALA. CODE § 10A-17-1.01 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59B-2 (2006). The in-
troductory comments to RUUNAA imply that it offers a codification of some 
common law principles and practices, which supports the conclusion that in 
some states without RUUNAA or its predecessor unincorporated associations 
have some legal status. See RUUNAA at Prefatory Note. 
315 As of this writing, eleven states currently use some version of UUNAA 
(Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), five states have adopted RUUNAA in 
some form (Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Nevada, and the District of Columbia), 
and Texas’s version of the UUNAA which had been in force expired as of the end 
of 2015. 29 West’s Legal Forms, Specialized Forms § 25:10 (West 2016); 29 West’s 
Legal Forms, Specialized Forms Section 25:11 (West 2016). See RUUNAA at Pref-
atory Note (2008); Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008), UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Unincor 
porated%20Nonprofit%20Association%20Act%20(2008)%20(Last%20Amended 
%202011) [https://perma.cc/29LT-F4HC]. 
316 Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 
294 F. Supp. 1148, 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1969); see also Kalamazoo v. Mich. Disposal 
Serv. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 219, 236 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (“Because unincorpo-
rated associations had no separate legal existence, courts regularly held that 
attorneys for unincorporated associations had a direct attorney-client relation-
ship with each of the members of the association.”); Connelly v. Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 339, 341 (D. Mass. 1982). 
317 See Russell G. Pearce, The Union Lawyer’s Obligations to Bargaining 
Unit Members: A Case Study of the Interdependence of Legal Ethics and Sub-
stantive Law, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1098–1100 (1996). 
318 See Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 236  (noting the emerging scholarly 
authority holding in certain contexts that “an attorney may represent such 
[unincorporated] associations without creating an attorney-client relationship 
with its individual members,” while concluding that the joint-defense agree-
ment among several criminal defendants did not qualify for that treatment). 
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organizational clients, as not requiring a group to possess “a sep-
arate jural entity” in order to qualify as an organization,319 and other 
commentators support that conclusion.320 
There is, however, a palpable challenge for a lawyer such as 
Hank working with a nascent charitable organization to proceed as 
though the unincorporated association is an entity that will serve 
as Hank’s only client. That challenge arises from what we might 
term the “boundary” problem. Here is the worry. The entity des-
ignation assumes a discrete, finite group of constituents, who may 
be identified and advised about the implications of entity repre-
sentation.321 With a community-based charitable organization like 
NCN, the membership of the group is unlikely to be fixed or obvi-
ous. For organizational representation to proceed responsibly, the 
boundaries of the organization must be definable, if for no other rea-
son than to have reasonable comfort that the lawyer understands 
who qualifies as a constituent and who does not, for purposes of 
attorney-client privilege322 and Rule 1.6 duties.323 
                                                                                                            
319 See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 365 (1992) 
(concluding that an unincorporated trade association may be treated as an en-
tity for purposes of conflicts of interest). 
320 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 62, § 18.06 (2016 Supp.); Stephen 
Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective 
Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers’ Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 1103, 1115–16, 1118 (1992); Tremblay, supra note 15. An Arizona State 
Bar ethics opinion, addressing the lawyer’s choices when forming a for-profit 
corporation, permitted the founders to elect to be treated as one entity client. 
See Ariz. St. Bar Formal Ethics Op. 02-06 (2002). 
321 In accepting the proposition that a group forming a startup for-profit 
business may be treated by a lawyer as an entity consistent with Rule 1.13, the 
Arizona State Bar Ethics Committee described a group with limited, identifia-
ble membership. See Ariz. St. Bar Formal Ethics Op. 02-06 (2002). 
322 A lawyer’s communications with legitimate constituents of an organizational 
client will be protected against disclosure in forensic settings by the attorney-
client privilege. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 
(2000). Communications with individuals who are not proper constituents are not 
privileged. See, e.g., In re Diasonics Securities Litig., 110 F.R.D. 570, 574 (D. Colo. 
1986) (determining that communications between officer of acquired organization 
and lawyer for predecessor organization were not privileged). 
323 Rule 1.6’s coverage is far broader than that of the attorney-client privi-
lege and the attorney must maintain communications even with persons out-
side of the organizational circle as confidential. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 
138. But that does not mean that the boundary problem is not relevant for 
Hank and his Rule 1.6 obligations. If Hank discloses information related to the 
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If Hank is satisfied that NCN has an identifiable, finite mem-
bership and a decision-making structure on which he may rely to 
discern appropriate lines of authority, he may choose to treat NCN 
as his client, and not the individual founders/leaders. But at this 
stage of his work with the loosely structured group and its founders, 
he is not required to treat the entity as his client. He may choose 
to identify Gilad, Lynnel, and Toni as individual clients subject to 
the joint client conflicts caveats identified earlier in the for-profit 
context.324 Prudence may suggest that he do so to eliminate the 
worries of working with an ill-structured community group.325 
If Hank happens to practice in a jurisdiction that has adopted 
RUUNAA,326 his assessment of his choices must account for that 
substantive law overlay. RUUNAA eliminates some of the ambi-
guity about the entity status of NCN as an unincorporated associ-
ation, establishing that under appropriate, defined circumstances 
such a group may be treated as an organization with an identity 
and rights separate from its members or managers.327 If nothing 
else, RUUNAA would permit Hank to make a more grounded and 
reliable determination of whether NCN is a lawful entity entitled 
to proceed in this representational space as a single client,328 and, 
if so, how he accepts directions from the unincorporated associa-
tion’s constituents.329 
                                                                                                            
representation to a person who is not a member of the client organization with-
out consent of a duly authorized constituent, he has breached his duties under 
Rule 1.6. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 89 (6th ed. 2007). 
324 See supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
325 See Susan D. Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in a Com-
munity Economic Development Clinic, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 45, 48–49, 70 (2002). 
326 The discussion in the text would not change if instead of RUUNAA 
Hank’s jurisdiction has adopted its predecessor, UUNAA. 
327 RUUNAA § 5(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2008); see also 
Elizabeth S. Miller, Doctoring the Law of Nonprofit Associations with a Band-Aid 
or a Body Cast: A Look at the 1996 and 2008 Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit 
Association Acts, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 852, 866 (2012). 
328 For instance, under section 2(8) of RUUNAA, NCN would constitute an unin-
corporated association covered by the act if it “consist[ed] of [two] or more mem-
bers joined by mutual consent pursuant to an agreement that is oral, in a record, 
or implied from conduct, for one or more common, nonprofit purposes ....” 
RUUNAA § 2(8) (2008). If it qualifies as an unincorporated association, then it 
is an entity distinct from its members with perpetual existence unless some 
factor serves to determine otherwise. Id. § 5(a)–(b). 
329 The unincorporated association would be managed by its managers. A 
“manager” is “a person that is responsible, alone or in concert with others, for the 
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2. Representational Responsibilities with a Charitable 
Enterprise Client 
One complexity remains for a lawyer working with founders of 
a charitable enterprise. That complexity relates to the deference 
a lawyer must offer to the strategic visions of the founders. The worry 
to be unpacked here is whether the charitable nature of the client’s 
mission, when compared to the typical economic success goals of 
a for-profit business, alters in any way the responsibilities of the 
nonprofit’s counsel. I will argue that it does, albeit in subtle ways. 
A lawyer representing the founders of a for-profit business may 
encounter challenges generated by the founders’ potentially varying 
personal interests. However, on questions about the underlying 
business model and the vision or goals of the business, the lawyer 
usually may comfortably follow the guidance of his clients.330 The 
for-profit organizational lawyer may be a rich source of business 
advice, of course,331 and most commentators agree that the lawyer 
possesses a commitment to advise companies about the moral im-
plications of their business strategies.332 Generally speaking, the 
                                                                                                            
management of an unincorporated nonprofit association,” id. § 2(3), and a 
“member” is “a person that, under the governing principles [of the entity], may 
participate in the selection of persons authorized to manage the affairs of the 
unincorporated nonprofit association or in the development of the policies and 
activities of the association,” id. § 2(4). The entity need not expressly provide 
such titles for those individuals; their function and activity determine their role. 
See Miller, supra note 327, at 877. 
330 See Kristen A. Carpenter & Eli Wald, Lawyering for Groups: The Case of 
American Indian Tribal Attorneys, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3085, 3141 (2013) (“[P]rac-
tically speaking, stating that a corporate lawyer represents the corporation 
means that the corporate lawyer’s clear and only role is to help the corporation 
pursue profit maximization, and the only remaining question is who is autho-
rized to speak and act for the corporation in pursuit of this one goal.”). 
331 See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Law-
yering for a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY 
L.J. 1057, 1062 (1997) (“This new generation of in-house lawyers ... frequently offers 
business as well as legal advice, and its members decidedly reject any notion that 
their role is limited to counseling clients on purely legal matters.”); Lynnise E. 
Pantin, Deals or No Deals: Integrating Transactional Skills in the First Year 
Curriculum, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 61, 81 (2014) (“lawyers ... participate in busi-
ness planning”); Amy L. Weiss, Note, In-House Counsel Beware: Wearing the 
Business Hat Could Mean Losing the Privilege, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 
393, 393 n.4 (noting that in-house counsel serve “as business advisors”). 
332 The literature on corporate lawyers’ moral responsibilities is extensive and 
rich. For a sampling of the discussion, see generally Anthony V. Alfieri, The 
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for-profit representation model operates on a client-centered, 
autonomy-driven stance,333 in large part because individual en-
trepreneurs and startup founders are entitled to take whatever 
risks they deem appropriate.334 
That same deference does not automatically follow when the 
lawyer works with a charitable organization. It is particularly deli-
cate when the lawyer works with the founders of such a startup. 
To illustrate the concerns, let us first consider the prospect of 
Hank’s work with three individual founders of the NCN nonprofit: 
Gilad, Lynnel, and Toni. The founders have connections to and sup-
port from the neighborhood residents, but Hank has opted to treat 
the three founders as his individual, joint clients. The clients’ goal 
is to establish an entity that can and will qualify for Section 
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. Until NCN, Inc.335 is established, 
Hank’s clients will be the three founders as persons. Unlike if 
they were founding a for-profit business, Hank must temper his 
guidance and counseling of the founders with attention to the 
public mission of the proposed venture and the interests of the 
larger neighborhood residents.336 Hank is, and must be, counsel 
to a larger situation in this setting.337 And he must be transparent 
                                                                                                            
Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEO. L. J. 1909 (2006); 
Susan Carle, Power as a Factor in Lawyers’ Ethical Deliberation, 35 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 115 (2006); Stephen L. Pepper, Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics 
(with Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client), 28 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1069 (2015); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary 
Law Firm Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931 (2002); Milton C. Regan, Jr., 
Foreword: Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 197 (2000). 
333 ALVAREZ & TREMBLAY, supra note 101, at 111–12. 
334 See Robert R. Statchen, Clinicians, Practitioners, and Scribes: Drafting 
Client Work Product in a Small Business Clinic, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 233, 
270 (2011–2012) (describing the risk-taking nature of entrepreneurs). 
335 The odds are enormous that Hank will advise the founders to establish 
a corporation to serve as the vehicle through which to operate NCN and to 
apply to the IRS for the tax exemption. Most tax-exempt entities are corpora-
tions. See David S. Walker, A Consideration of an LLC for a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit 
Organization, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 633 (2012) (“[T]he ‘predominant’ 
form of charitable organization in the United States is the nonprofit corporation.”) 
(citing JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 48–
53 (4th ed. 2010)). 
336 Tremblay, supra note 15, at 390. 
337 The commonly referenced “lawyer for the situation” concept, originating 
with Louis Brandeis, has been popularized in legal ethics circles by Geoffrey 
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with Gilad, Lynnel, and Toni about that gloss on his representa-
tional responsibilities.338 
In that sense, Hank has what could be described as divided 
loyalties. In reality this does not represent a conflict of interest for 
him, in the same way that his choice to represent the multiple found-
ers might. The “conflict,” such as it is, is inherent in any lawyer’s 
work on behalf of founders of an organization that commits to a 
mission that transcends the interests of its founders.339 Hank’s 
role is somewhat comparable to that of a lawyer for a fiduciary, in 
that the founders necessarily accept responsibilities for interests 
beyond their own personal ones.340 The prevailing understanding 
is that a lawyer representing a fiduciary treats the fiduciary as his 
sole client. He does not represent the ward, but may only proceed 
with strategies that do not undermine the interests of the ward.341 
Similarly, Hank may robustly represent the three founder clients 
and honor their wishes, but only inasmuch as their strategies are 
consistent with the mission and governance constraints of a suc-
cessfully functional nonprofit organization.342 
                                                                                                            
Hazard. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 65 (1978); 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 377 (2004). 
For a description of Brandeis’s connection to the term “counsel for the situation,” 
see Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s 
Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1502–04, 1502 n.194 (1996). 
338 Tremblay, supra note 15, at 390. 
339 See Simon, supra note 5, at 59 (noting the difficulty lawyers face in rep-
resenting organizations consisting of constituents with conflicting interests). 
340 See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 300 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
341 The American Bar Association articulates the duty in a more lawyer-
friendly fashion, emphasizing that the fiduciary is the client and the ward or 
beneficiary a third party like any other third party. ABA Comm. on Ethics & 
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 380 (1994). Commentators take a more nu-
anced stance of the special role in which the lawyer finds himself. See generally 
Kennedy Lee, Representing the Fiduciary: To Whom Does the Attorney Owe 
Duties?, 37 ACTEC L.J. 469 (2011); Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving 
Fiduciary Entities: Who Is the Client?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (1994); Robert 
W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889 (1994). 
342 Especially where the founders of the nonprofit organization aim to 
achieve tax-exempt status from the IRS (which is the most likely scenario), the 
founders’ choices about organizational structures and visions will be limited by 
the IRS’s rules and policies. For instance, the organization must be organized 
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Hank must also, notwithstanding his representational duties 
to the three joint clients, attend to the worries that commentators 
capture with the term “founder’s syndrome.”343 Hank represents 
three individuals, but his commitment is to the organization that 
the individuals will establish.344 Its founders may, and often do, 
desire to include in the corporate governance documents provi-
sions that will assure that the founders maintain control over the 
organization.345 Such provisions would be entirely appropriate in 
for-profit corporation or LLC papers.346 They might not be appro-
priate in nonprofit organizational documents,347 even if the IRS 
would not object to their inclusion, and even if the three founders 
were insistent that the provisions be included. Hank will need to 
exercise his discretionary judgment to determine whether the con-
trol provisions sufficiently benefit the soon-to-be created organi-
zation, rather than the personal preferences of the founders.348 His 
                                                                                                            
and operated in such a way that none of the founders will receive private ben-
efit or inurement except in certain limited circumstances. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) (2012); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2015). The organization must have 
in place protections against conflicts of interest. See generally Melanie B. 
Leslie, Helping Nonprofits Police Themselves: What Trust Law Can Teach Us 
About Conflicts of Interest, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 551 (2010). 
343 See STEPHEN R. BLOCK, WHY NONPROFITS FAIL: OVERCOMING FOUNDER’S 
SYNDROME, FUNDPHOBIA, AND OTHER OBSTACLES TO SUCCESS 135–54 (2004); see 
also LESLIE R. CRUTCHFIELD & HEATHER MCLEOD GRANT, FORCES FOR GOOD: THE 
SIX PRACTICES OF HIGH-IMPACT NONPROFITS 169, 171 (2008); James J. Fishman, 
Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 250, 250 n.235 (2003) 
(describing leadership unwilling to defer to the good of the organization). 
344 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (2003) (“[A] lawyer em-
ployed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through 
its duly authorized constituents.”). 
345 See Mary E. Costello, The Non-Profit Founder’s Dilemma: Tempering Issues 
of Control and Ownership (2007), http://www.creativeedgeconsulting.org/TheNon 
-ProfitFoundersDilemma-TemperingIssuesofControlandOwnership.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/R859-FUXS]; see also Noam Wasserman, The Founder’s Dilemma, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2008, at 104. 
346 Most corporate governance documents include mechanisms to address 
control by the founders, subject to whatever later negotiations might occur 
with future investors or shareholders. See, e.g., GEORGE W. KUNEY & BRIAN K. 
KRUMM, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL LAW CLINIC HANDBOOK 51–52 (2013); REED & 
BARRON, supra note 18, at 61; Costello, supra note 345. 
347 See Costello, supra note 345. 
348 See Robin S. Golden, Collaborative as Client: Lawyering for Effective 
Change, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 393, 409 (2011–2012) (offering examples of a 
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opinion, as a lawyer, on that question is sufficient. He need not be 
bound by the instructions of his named clients.349 
I do not intend to assume in these observations any hubris on 
Hank’s part, or to succumb to the “generalization of expertise” cog-
nitive illusion.350 Instead, the underlying ethical mandate here rests 
on the understanding that charitable institutions commit to what 
we might deem a “thick theory of the good,”351 while for-profit or-
ganizations, especially privately held businesses, can pursue the 
idiosyncrasies of their owners, and lawyers have little right to in-
terfere with that pursuit.352 Nonprofit founders may pursue idio-
syncratic missions in a more cabined way, and their perception of 
the social justice strategies may be debated or challenged.353 
CONCLUSION 
Most lawyers hired to establish a new startup business will 
work with individual founders for some period of time before an 
entity emerges, and those lawyers will necessarily make choices 
about how to craft an appropriate engagement agreement with 
                                                                                                            
social justice “collaborative” as the lawyer’s client, rather than any particular 
members of the group). 
349 No reported case or disciplinary report has addressed the argument made in 
the text, but its logic follows from Hank’s recognition that Gilad, Lynnel, and 
Toni serve as surrogates for the charitable mission, and the unnamed commu-
nity members who support the mission, which NCN, Inc. will pursue once it is 
established. Once an entity has been created, Hank will have more defined 
duties to honor the wishes of the duly authorized constituents, even if Hank 
disagrees with the values expressed by those instructions. See In re Wise, 740 
N.E.2d 946, 955–56 (Mass. 2000) (concluding that attorney for nonprofit or-
ganization should be suspended for supporting ousted board members whose 
choices he favored, over the objections of current board members). 
350 In bioethics circles, the “generalization of expertise” concern represents 
the cognitive bias that assumes that an individual expert in medicine will have 
expertise in other areas, such as moral questions. See Robert M. Veatch, General-
ization of Expertise, 1 HASTINGS CTR. STUDIES 29, 29 (1973); Bethany Spielman 
& George Agich, The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining 
Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1048–
50 (1999). 
351 William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s 
Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 225 (1991). 
352 See William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Nego-
tiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1447, 1455–56 (1992) (lawyers too often do not respect the idiosyncrasies 
of clients). 
353 See Tremblay, supra note 15, at 463. 
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the founder-clients. This Article has demonstrated that lawyers in 
those settings must be especially attentive to the status the founders 
are entitled to based on the jurisdiction’s common and statutory 
law. Some founders will have rights as individuals; others will be 
partners. The differences may matter to the work the lawyer accom-
plishes. Counsel for a startup must also anticipate that a group of 
founders might include participants who may not actually qualify as 
founders; therefore, perhaps may not warrant inclusion in the client 
collective. Among those founders who do qualify, some may drift 
away, replaced by others. This creative and dynamic dance pre-
sents ethical opportunities for the team’s lawyer, as she pursues 
clarity about her relationship with those individuals. This Article 
may serve as at least a preliminary guide for lawyers who find 
themselves in this common setting. 
 
